RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE HISTORY, THE DOCTRINE, AND
THE FUTURE
Stephen M. Feldman
INTRODUCTION
Progressive or liberal constitutional scholars who focus on religious freedom have not been pleased with the Rehnquist Court.' For
more than a decade, it seems, the Court has been handing down decisions that have twisted the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
in an unduly conservative direction. Most notably, Employment Division v. Smith radically transformed free exercise doctrine, while Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,3 the voucher case, consolidated the Court's recent Establishment Clause cases into a modified doctrinal approach.
As a consequence, First Amendment protections have apparently
shrunken to their smallest since World War II, especially for religious
minorities.4
Jerry W. Housel/Carl P. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of
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SeeJesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the ConstitutionalProtection of Religious Liberty, 70
NEB. L. REv. 651, 687 (1991) (arguing against the Court's rejection of a compelling interest
analysis for Free Exercise Clause challenges to general statutory prohibitions of certain conduct); Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90
CAL. L. REv. 673, 678-79 (2002) (arguing that the Court has changed its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in adopting an equality, rather than liberty, rationale); Richard K. Sherwin, Rhetorical Pluralism and the Discourse Ideal: Countering Division of Employment v. Smith, A Parableof
Pagans, Politics, and MajoritarianRule, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 388, 393 (1991) (criticizing the Court's
decision in Smith as ignoring its interpretive obligations by deferring to "legislative/majoritarian
interest accommodation and mangement efficiency"). For an attack on the Court's free exercise jurisprudence from a more conservative political perspective, see Michael W. McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1153 (1990) (arguing
against the Smith Court's "bare requirement of formal neutrality").
2 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
4 Justice Breyer writes: "The Court, in effect, turns the clock back. It adopts, under the
name of 'neutrality,' an interpretation of the Establishment Clause that this Court rejected
more than halfa century ago." Id. at 728 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter writes:
[T]he reality is that in the matter of educational aid the Establishment Clause has largely
been read away. True, the majority has not approved vouchers for religious schools
alone, or aid earmarked for religious instruction. But no scheme so clumsy will ever get
before us, and in the cases that we may see, like these, the Establishment Clause is largely
silenced.
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This pessimistic assessment of Religion Clause jurisprudence is
based on two hypotheses: first, that the Court for several decades,
starting in the 1940s, was particularly receptive to the Religion Clause
claims of minorities; second, that the Rehnquist Court's doctrinal innovations will turn subsequent Religion Clause cases against minorities in an unprecedented fashion. This Article challenges both these
hypotheses. If the postwar cases are examined from a political, cultural, and social perspective, rather than from a doctrinal one, they
reveal a surprising level ofjudicial hostility toward religious outsiders.
To a great extent, then, the Rehnquist Court merely has maintained
this antagonism and, in all likelihood, will continue to do so in the
future. To be sure, the Rehnquist Court has transformed First
Amendment doctrine, but these changes are unlikely to produce results substantially different from prior decisions. 5
In making this argument, this Article contributes to an emerging
strand of Religion Clause revisionism in legal scholarship. During
the post-World War II era, most scholars have subscribed to a conventional account of the First Amendment. This standard story maintains, first, that the Framers laid down a foundational principle of religious freedom, and second, that the post-World War II Supreme
Court-at least before the Rehnquist Court arrived-formulated doctrine to help fulfill that principle, thus affording great protection to
religious outsiders. Numerous writers would agree with William Lee
Miller's declaration of religious liberty: "We 'secured' it-our forefathers did ... and on the whole it has stayed secured." 6 The Court itself has pronounced that the First Amendment guarantees "religious
liberty and equality to 'the infidel, the atheist,
7 or the adherent of a
orJudaism.'
Islam
as
such
faith
non-Christian

Id. at 717 (SouterJ., dissenting).
I do not mean to suggest that the Rehnquist Court is not worse than previous Courts for
religious minorities. This Court is worse, but the change is not nearly as pronounced as many
assume or argue. The transition, for religious minorities, is more a matter of degree than of
kind.
6 WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
at vii
(1985). John Noonan wrote that the First Amendment guaranteed "to all a freedom from religious oppression ....

ideal."

JOHN

T.

Never before 1791 such a public, almost unalterable commitment to this

NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY:

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF

2 (1998). Stephen L. Carter applauded the separation of church and state
as "one of the great gifts that American political philosophy has presented to the world."
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
STEPHEN

L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 107 (1993).

Thomas Curry declared that the

First Amendment-"the great American experiment"-should be understood "as a proclamation of principle." Indeed, the ability of immigrants "to achieve religious liberty," Curry wrote,
illustrates "how deeply the principle of religious freedom was embedded in American culture
and government." THOMASJ. CURRY, FAREWELL TO CHRISTENDOM 4-5, 58 (2001).
7 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 52 (1985)).
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Nonetheless, a revisionist understanding of religious freedom has
recently begun to emerge.8 According to one strand of this revisionist work, history reveals that, contrary to the Whiggish conventional
account of the Religion Clauses, the First Amendment often has
failed to provide equal liberty to religious minorities.9 A second,
though related, strand of revisionist work has begun to detail how the
meaning and degree of religious freedom has varied through American history according to contingent political, cultural, and social interests. 0 Along these lines, two important recent articles, one byJohn
C.Jeffries,Jr., andJames E. Ryan, and one by Thomas C. Berg, explicitly tied the post-World War II development of religious freedom in
America to the evolving political relations between Protestants and
Roman Catholics rather than to the fulfillment of a predetermined
constitutional principle." Philip Hamburger's even more recent
book, Separation of Church and State, while focused on the importance
of Protestant-Catholic relations for the nineteenth-century development of religious liberty, largely agrees with the views of Jeffries and
Ryan, and Berg, on the post-World War II period.
Revisionist and conventional scholars agree, though, on at least
one important point. Before the post-World War II era, the religion3
clauses were almost toothless in the United States Supreme Court.1
8 Cf G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 1-5
(2000) (contrasting
conventional and revisionist accounts of the New Deal-era constitutional revolution).
9 See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, A Christian America and the Separationof Church and
State, in
LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 261, 262-66 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) (discussing how the Supreme Court's determination of what is religious favors Christianity); Frank
S. Ravitch, A Crack in the Wall: Pluralism, Prayer, and Pain in the Public Schools, in LAW AND
RELIGION, supra, 296, 296-303 (detailing the discrimination and harassment of religious minorities who object to mainstream religious practices in the public schools); Samuel J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Through a Religious Minority Perspective,5
WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 153, 160-62 (1996) (arguing that Supreme Court majorities have failed
to accord respect to religious minorities).
10 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A
MERRY CHRISTMAS:

HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 175-203 (1997)

A CRITICAL

[hereinafter FELDMAN,

PLEASE DON'T] (discussing the politically driven development of a concept of separation of
church and state after the framing of the Constitution); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE 14-17 (2002) (focusing on Protestant-Catholic relations in the nineteenth
century to trace the transformation of religious liberty into a separation principle); Thomas C.
Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 121, 123-51 (2001)
(discussing the importance of Protestant-Catholic relations to the separation of church and
state during the 1940s to the early 1960s);John C. Jeffries,Jr. &James E. Ryan, A PoliticalHistory
of the Establishment Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 297-305 (2001) (attributing nineteenthcentury state efforts to ban funding to sectarian schools to Protestant-Catholic disputes); see also
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE 4-7 (1995)

(arguing that dif-

ferent communities generate different discourses that describe the relationship between church
and state in distinctive and sometimes incompatible ways).
1 Berg, supra note 10, at 123-51;Jeffties & Ryan, supra note 10, at 312-27.
12 HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 450-63.
13 For example,Jesse H. Choper writes:
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Few cases made their way to the Court, and in those few cases, the
Court typically upheld the governmental actions, whether challenged
under either the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause.' 4 During
and after the war, however, the Court transformed its Religion Clause
jurisprudence. In the 1940s, the Court incorporated both religion
clauses to apply against state and local actions through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'5 Consequently, many
more governmental actions were subject to constitutional attack and
an increasing number of cases reached the Court. Equally important,
the Court became more receptive to these new Religion Clause
claims, occasionally striking down the challenged governmental actions. 16
From a revisionist standpoint, this jurisprudential transformation
presents an interesting twofold problem: how precisely did the
Court's approach to these Religion Clause cases change, and what
factors contributed to those changes? The Jeffries and Ryan article,
in conjunction with the Berg article, uncovers a significant part of
this story. If one adds together all the sundry Protestant denominations and sects, Protestants always have constituted the largest proportion of the American population. During the first 150 years of the
nation's history, America was, to a great extent, "de facto" Protestant. 7 Freedom of conscience, or the free exercise of religion, was
based directly on Protestant doctrine, while official disestablishment
arose primarily because of competition among a multitude of Protestant groups. 8 Put in different words, religious freedom under the
[B]efore the middle of this century, these provisions of the Bill of Rights applied only to
the federal government; since the states enacted most legislation, and Congress was quite
inactive in regulating domestic affairs, there simply was not much occasion for the Supreme Court to interpret the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Where they were
in issue, the Court afforded them a relatively restricted meaning.
Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1709, 1712 (2000).
14 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-67
(1878) (upholding governmental
proscription of the Mormon practice of polygamy); see also Carl H. Esbeck, Table of United States
Supreme Court Decisions Relating to Religious Liberty 1789-1994, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 573 (19931994) (summarizing cases).
15 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947) (incorporating
the Establishment Clause);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause).
16 For a brief summary of the cases, see Esbeck, supra note
14, at 575-78 (tracing this de
facto establishment of religion to the evangelical principle of separation).
17 See MARK DEWVOLFE HOuE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 11 (1965)
(arguing that
there is de facto separation). Some commentators argue that, due to demographic changes,
there was a second disestablishment-a disestablishment of the nation's unofficial or de facto
Protestantism that was complete by the end of the 1930s. See, e.g., MichaelJ. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1996).
18

See FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T, supra note 10, at 145-58. The connection between freedom

of conscience and Protestant doctrine (and experience) was suggested in the 1824 decision,
Updegraph v. Commonwealth, in which the court approved a blasphemy statute: "This act, was not
passed, as the counsel supposed, when religious and civil tyranny were at their height; but on
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First Amendment emerged initially from, and was largely understood
as consistent with, the mainstream Protestant values and interests.
Yet, starting in the mid-nineteenth century, immigration
S 19 helped
produce an ever-expanding American Catholic community. From
1850 to 1900, the Catholic population grew from 1.7 million to 12
million, and by 1930, that number had doubled.2 0 As early as 1920,
one in six Americans and one in three church members were Catholic. 2 1

If measured against the respective Protestant denominations

and sects, Catholics had become by the 1950s the largest Christian
group in America: while the total number of Protestants still far outnumbered Catholics, Catholics nonetheless exceeded the largest

the breaking forth of the sun of religious liberty, by those who had suffered much for conscience' sake, and fled from ecclesiastical oppression." Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg.
& Rawle 394, 407 (Pa. 1824), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 170, 174 (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Noah Feldman, however, has recently argued that both
free exercise and disestablishment in the First Amendment were intellectually grounded on a
principled commitment to liberty of conscience. Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the
Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002).
Helpful historical discussions, related to the development of religious freedom, include the
following: SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1972);
MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS (1984); JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH:
CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1990); CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(Donald L. Drakeman & John F. Wilson eds., 2d ed. Beacon Press 1987) (1965); NAOMI W.
COHEN,JEWS IN CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE PURSUIT OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (1992); THOMASJ.
CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1986); FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T, supra note 10, ROBERT T. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN
AMERICA (2d ed. rev. 1984); NATHAN 0. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN
CHRISTIANITY (1989); WINTHROP S. HUDSON &JOHN CORRIGAN, RELIGION IN AMERICA (5th ed.
1992); GREGG IVERS, TO BUILD A WALL: AMERICAN JEWS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE (1995); FREDERIC COPLEJAHER, A SCAPEGOAT IN THE NEW WILDERNESS: THE ORIGINS AND
RISE OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICA (1994); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); MARTIN E. MARTY, PROTESTANTISM IN THE UNITED
STATES: RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE (Scribener Book Cos. 1986) (1970); ERIC MICHAEL MAZUR, THE
AMERICANIZATION OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES:
CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
(1999); RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION (1972); PETER NOVICK, THE
HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE (1999); LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1953); THE
SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (Del Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter IN CONFERENCE]; ANSON
PHELPS STOKES, 1 CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE
RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION (1988); Harold J. Berman, Religion and Law: The First
Amendment in HistoricalPerspective, 35 EMORY L.J. 777 (1986); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of
the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995);
Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106 (1994).
19 Hamburger stresses the degree to which a significant aspect of the nineteenth-century
Protestant values and interests was wound up with anti-Catholicism. Furthermore, he argues
that this factor helped transform religious liberty into the separation of church and state.
HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 191-251.
20 Klarman, supra note 17, at 49; see alsoJeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 306 (describing
Catholics' rise in population and political power in the first half of the twentieth century).
21 HUDSON & CORRIGAN, supra note 18, at 241.
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Protestant denomination, the Baptists, by almost two to one.
Throughout the rest of the century, the relative proportion of ProtesThe prestants and Catholics would remain roughly unchanged.
ence of such a large Catholic community in America had serious repercussions, generally increasing Catholic political power and, at
different times, generating Protestant backlashes. Jeffries, Ryan, and
Berg specifically explore how these factors influenced the develop23
ment of the concept of religious freedom during the postwar era.
Despite the importance of their work, Jeffries, Ryan, and Berg
overlook a crucial point. The true measure of a nation's commitment to religious freedom, it would seem, lies in its treatment of religious minorities or outgroups. Given the superior size of the American Catholic population vis-i-vis even the largest Protestant
denominations and sects-as of 1999, Catholics constituted twentyeight percent of the total population and outnumbered Southern
Baptists by a whopping forty-six million 24-a history of religious freedom in America that focuses solely on Catholic-Protestant relations is
likely to miss an important part of the story. For that reason, while
this Article discusses Catholic-Protestant connections, it primarily explores cases involving American Jews, who have always remained a
numerically small religious minority, regardless of their various social
and political successes (and failures) in this country. In the words of
be, how was it for the
William
2 Lee Miller, "the prime test would
Jews?",5
Part I examines two factors that contributed to the Court's changing approach to religious freedom during and after World War II:
22

SeeAHLSTROM, supra note 18, at 1002; MARTY, supra note 18, at 208. In the 1990s, nine out

of ten Americans claimed a specific religious affiliation, with 86.5% of them being Christians.
HUDSON & CORRIGAN, supra note 18, at 425. Of those Christians, Protestants outnumbered
Catholics approximately two to one. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 61 tbl.74, 62 tbl.75 (2000); MARTY, supra note 18, at 3. Yet Catholics were the

largest Christian group, at 26% of the population, with Baptists second. Less than 2% of the
American population is Jewish and only 0.5% is Muslim.
23 Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10; Berg, supra note 10; see also HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at
450-63 (discussing post-World War II anti-Catholicism). Douglas Laycock previously had mentioned a link between anti-Catholicism and the Justices' attitudes toward religious freedom.
Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 57-58

(1997). Laycock, in turn, had relied on John T. McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism
in the American IntellectualImagination, 1928-1960, 84J. AM. HIST. 97 (1997).
24 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 61
tbl.74, 62 tbl.75 (2000).
25 MILLER, supra note 6, at 195. Berg barely mentions the role of American Jews, Berg, supra
note 10, at 149, while Jeffries and Ryan accord the topic only slightly more attention. Jeffries &
Ryan, supra note 10, at 305-08. Hamburger does devote some minimal attention to Jews, but
given his near-500 page text, his devotion of part of one section, amounting to six pages, together with a few additional brief references, has to be considered scant and insufficient.
HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 391-96. To be fair to Berg, Jeffries, Ryan, and Hamburger, their
focus was on Protestant-Catholic relations rather than on Christian-Jewish relations. But again,
that disregard ofJews and antisemitism is one important reason for writing this Article.
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first, the increasingly powerful American Catholic community, and
26
second, a transformation within the American Jewish community.
Part II focuses on how religious outsiders, chiefly American Jews, argued Religion Clause claims before the Supreme Court during the
postwar era, and how the Court responded to the different types of
arguments in its decisions.27 When, on the one hand, Jews and other
non-Christians asked the Court to create an apparent exception to
the mainstream understanding of religion and religious freedom by
invoking the Free Exercise Clause, the Court denied their claims.
When, on the other hand, Jews instead urged the Court to stretch the
shield of the Establishment Clause so that they too might have refuge,
they occasionally were successful. Religious freedom thus has developed from its initial Protestant origins and understanding so that it
now extends at least some meaningful protection to Jews and other
religious outsiders.28
See infra text accompanying notes 34-69.
See infra text accompanying notes 70-170.
28 Cf Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980) (arguing that African Americans historically have gained social justice
only when their interests happened to converge with the interests of the white majority). The
question of who constitutes a religious outsider is, of course, subject to sharp dispute. For purposes of this Article, I do not need to give one precise and static definition of religious outsiders. In the course of the discussion, I identify which specific religious groups I am discussing
when it is relevant. Most often, I intend the term, religious outsiders, to denote non-Christians.
Generally, I follow the political scientist James C. Brent who distinguishes mainstream from
nonmainstream religions. To Brent, any non-Christian religion is nonmainstream in America.
Most Christian religions are mainstream, though some of the minority Christian groups, such as
the Seventh-day Adventists and the Jehovah's Witnesses, are deemed nonmainstream. SeeJames
C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals Responses to Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 27 AM. POL.
Q. 236, 259 (1999); cf. Frank Way & Barbara J. Burt, Religious Marginality and the Free Exercise
Clause, 77 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 652, 654 & n.7 (1983) (distinguishing mainline from marginal religions).
Although I emphasize constitutional development (or judicial transformation) in this Article, I
do not mean to preclude the possibility that America can experience constitutional revolutions,
as suggested by Bruce Ackerman. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
In the realm of the history of American jurisprudence, I have suggested that neither evolution
nor revolution precisely captures the nature of change:
[A] broad idea, X, might tend to develop into another idea, Y, but this development
might not emerge unless and until particular social, political, and cultural circumstances
arise that facilitate or trigger it. As a general matter, the elements for a major intellectual change-say, from X to Y-often seem to gather over an extended time period, like
clouds on the horizon, but the transition remains latent, as a mere potential, until a
large social disturbance such as a Civil or World War occurs. This social upheaval then
precipitates the intellectual transformation, like a sudden burst of rain. Of course, as described, the intellectual transformation is neither exactly sudden nor exactly gradualneither revolutionary nor evolutionary. Despite final appearances, the intellectual transition should not be understood as an unexpected or unpredictable cloudburst because
it has been building for years and sometimes even decades. Yet, even so, it is not truly
gradual, steady, and slow because the transition does not emerge in a clearly recognizable form until the requisite social event finally triggers the ultimate transformation.
26
27
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Part III of the Article looks to the future. It begins by tracing the
Rehnquist Court's recent doctrinal changes in establishment and free
exercise cases and explains how those changes appear to favor mainstream religions while harming religious outsiders. 9 Part III then
recommends several possible doctrinal innovations that might bolster
First Amendment protections for religious outsiders. 0 Part III next
discusses the probability that these recommended changes would
prove fruitful. Drawing from history, as detailed in Parts I and II,
the unfortunate reality is that the Court is unlikely to adopt these
recommendations, regardless of their virtues. Part III concludes,
however, by explaining that the Court's own recent doctrinal
changes, when understood in light of the history of Religion Clause
cases, will not turn future First Amendment cases in a drastically
more conservative direction 2
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM:
AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 5-6 (2000) (footnote omitted).

See infra text accompanying notes 171-95.
so See infra text accompanying notes 197-209.
31 See infra text accompanying notes
210-23.
32 Apart from the revisionist scholarship specifically focusing
on religious freedom, my argument builds on three emerging and interrelated lines of thought from political science and
constitutional scholarship. First, in his landmark 1997 book, Civic Ideals, Rogers M. Smith articulated a "multiple traditions thesis [which] holds that American political actors have always
promoted civic ideologies that blend liberal, democratic republican, and inegalitarian ascriptive

elements in various combinations." ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS 6 (1997).

In this Article, I

elaborate the inegalitarian ascriptive element of the American understanding of religious freedom-an element of our constitutionalism that most often is obscured, denied, or ignored.
Second, I follow scholars such as Robert A. Dahl and MichaelJ. Klarman who have argued that,
as a general matter, the Supreme Court does not heroically protect outsiders from majoritarian
overreaching. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6J. PUB. L. 279, 293-94 (1957) ("As an element in the political leadership of the
dominant alliance, the Court of course supports the major policies of the alliance. By itself the
Court is almost powerless to affect the course of national policy."); Klarman, supra note 17, at 17 (arguing that contrary to popular belief, the Court does not play a strong countermajoritarian
role in defense of individual liberties); see also Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, PartOne: The Road to JudicialSupremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998) (questioning the existence of a countermajoritarian difficulty). Rather, the Court tends to be a part of
and support, in Dahl's words, "the dominant national alliance." Dahl, supra, at 293. While the
Court, to a degree, might be politically insulated, it certainly is not politically isolated. Finally, I
follow scholars such as Michael J. Klarman, Stephen M. Griffin, Barry Friedman, and Scott B.
Smith in seeking to understand American constitutionalism from a historical perspective that
accounts for all of American history, not just the framing; this approach resonates with the historical new institutionalism that is blossoming in political science. See Barry Friedman & Scott
B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1998) ("[Rieplac[ing] the apparent choice between anachronistic originalism or non-historical living constitutionalism with
an approach that takes all of our constitutional history into account."); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 2115, 2116 (1999) (defining historical institutionalism as a "state-centered" approach because it takes the concept of the state seriously and focuses
on its halting evolution through American history); Klarman, supra note 17, at 1-7 (arguing
that the Court does not play a strong countermajoritarian role in defense of individual liberties); Friedman and Smith write: "[H]istory is essential to interpretation of the Constitution,
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The Article ends with a brief Conclusion. To clarify at the outset,
I use the term religiousfreedom in this Article in a conventional sense:
as referring to the relationship between religion and government, or
to what is commonly called the separation of church and state. Religious freedom, in other words, is a constitutional guarantee that encompasses issues that fall ordinarily under either the Free Exercise
Clause, the Establishment Clause, or both.3

but the relevant history is not just that of the Founding, it is that of all American constitutional
history." Friedman & Smith, supra, at 5-6. Griffin writes:
[A]II the theories of constitutional interpretation normally discussed by scholars accept
an ahistorical view about the role that the constitutional principles of the early republic
can and should play in the complex democracy of the present. The emphasis in these
theories-characteristic of American constitutionalism from the beginning-is on how
the fundamental principles adopted by the Founding generation can solve contemporary
constitutional problems. This approach is completely implausible from an historicist
perspective.
Griffin, supra, at 2120. Elsewhere, Griffin explains that "[c]onstitutionalism should be appreciated as a dynamic political and historical process rather than as a static body of thought laid
down in the eighteenth century."
THEORYTO POLITICS 5 (1996).

STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM:

FROM

In political science, new institutionalists explain how Supreme Court Justices are influenced
by both their political preferences and the structural or institutional mechanisms in which they
operate (as Justices). For a helpful explanation of the new institutionalism, see Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach: PostbehavioralistApproaches to Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 601 (2000) (reviewing SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999)). See alsoTHE SUPREME COURT
IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW LNSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Howard Gillman & Cornell
W. Clayton eds., 1999). Rogers M. Smith is an example of a historical new institutionalist.
SMITH, supra, at 6, 509-10.
Thus, I agree with G. Edward White's and Barry Cushman's view that Supreme Court decision making is not pure politics. Instead, Supreme CourtJustices find legal consciousness to be
a real constraint on their decisions. See WHITE, supra note 8, at 1-32; Barry Cushman, Rethinking
the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REv. 201, 207-08 (1994) (rejecting the idea that the Supreme
Court's acceptance of the New Deal was based on President Roosevelt's attempt to pack the
Court and emphasizing instead the role of lawyering). Indeed, part of what I write about in this
Article is the shaping or construction of legal consciousness, specifically the law related to the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. Needless to say, though, I believe that cultural, societal, and political interests strongly influence such legal developments.
33 For instance, Erwin Chemerinsky writes: "To a large extent, the establishment and free
exercise clauses are complementary. Both protect freedom of religious belief and actions."
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1140 (2d ed. 2002) (cita-

tions omitted). Laurence H. Tribe writes similarly: "The constitutional concepts of religious
autonomy were first articulated in the religion clauses of the first amendment, assuring both
free exercise and nonestablishment."

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1154 (2d ed. 1988) (footnote omitted). Many commentators have noted that, while the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses are interrelated, there also is a tension between the two.
CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 1140-41; TRIBE, supra, at 1154.
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I. CAUSES OF CHANGE

A. Catholic-ProtestantRelations
The enhanced American Catholic population strongly contributed to the Court's increased receptiveness toward religious freedom
cases during and after World War II. In some parts of the country,
the political ramifications of the growing Catholic community became apparent as early as the nineteenth century. By the 1880s,
Catholic mayors had been elected in several Northeastern cities, including New York and Boston. 4 During Prohibition in the 1920s,
Catholics did not need to seek judicial intervention to protect their
sacramental use of wine because Congress had readily created a legislative exception for such use.35 The expanding Catholic political
power, furthermore, affected attitudes toward the separation of
church and state. Specifically, Catholic and Protestant attitudes had
traditionally diverged on church-state issues: Protestants tended to
favor religious (predominantly Protestant) practices in the public
schools but opposed governmental aid to nonpublic (predominantly
Catholic) schools, while Catholics tended to hold the opposite viewpoints. Protestant political power long had allowed them to impose
their preferences, but during the 1920s and 1930s, Catholic political
power in a number of states had grown sufficient "to secure enactment of laws subsidizing parochial schools with publicly funded text,36
Moreover, at least some state courts
books and bus transportation.
in heavily Catholic states, such as Wisconsin and Illinois, became reto Bible reading and religious displays
ceptive to Catholic challenges
371
in the public schools.

Klarman, supra note 17, at 52.
35 Volstead Act of Oct. 28, 1919, 41 Stat. 305, codified at 27 U.S.C. § 16, repealed by Act of
Aug.

27, 1935, 49 Stat. 872; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 195, 216 (1992) (noting that mainstream Christian groups, such as the Roman Catholics
during Prohibition, generally do not need to seek free exercise exemptions in the courts).
36 Klarman, supra note 17,
at 53.
37 Id. at 49-50. Jeffries and
Ryan write:
As early as 1869, the school board in Cincinnati, then one of the most religiously heterogeneous of American cities, voted to ban Bible reading, hymns, and religious instruction
in the public schools. The resulting firestorm of protest prompted litigation all the way
to the Ohio Supreme Court, which eventually ruled that the school board was permitted to
omit religious instruction if it wished. Some urban centers with large Catholic populations followed suit. In the 1870s, New York City, Chicago, Buffalo, and Rochester
banned Bible reading in the public schools. Indeed, by the early twentieth century, a few
state courts had outlawed Bible reading and other religious observances in public school
as violative of state constitutions, though most courts continued to approve these practices.
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 304 (footnotes omitted).
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Needless to say, though, many Protestants did not meekly accept
enhanced Catholic political power and assertiveness. 8 In the late
1940s, for instance, several mainstream Protestant denominations
joined to form Protestants and Other Americans United ("POAU")
for the Separation of Church and State, which was vociferously antiCatholic and strongly opposed public aid for parochial schools.3

9

In-

deed, most important, the Supreme Court's judicial enforcement of
religious freedom after World War II can be understood, in part, as a
Protestant reaction to the perceived Catholic threat within the
American democracy. 4° The Supreme Court always remained overwhelmingly Protestant; from the 1940s through the 1970s, no more
than one Catholic and one Jew ever sat on the Court at any time.'
Insofar as Catholic and Protestant values and practices diverged, the
separation of church and state became partly a mechanism that
Protestants could invoke to prevent or retard the imposition of
Unsurprisingly, then, in cases challenging
Catholic views.
governmental aid to nonpublic schools, which are overwhelmingly
Catholic, the Supreme Court struck down the governmental action as
unconstitutional nearly twice as often as it upheld the action. 2
According tojeffries and Ryan:
38 See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 313 (discussing postwar Protestant opposition
to

Catholics).

39 IVERS, supra note 18, at 26 (discussing the evolution of POAU
and its anti-Catholic
agenda).
40 Cf. Wuthnow, supra note 18, at 72-74 (discussing Protestant
perceptions of a Roman
Catholic threat). Berg writes that during the post-World War II years, "the alleged political
power and danger of the Catholic Church was the most prominent issue in America concerning
religion and public life." Berg, supra note 10, at 124; see also id. at 129 (detailing documented
anti-Catholic sentiments of Supreme CourtJustices).
41 Through 1990, 91 of 104 Supreme Court Justices came from Protestant backgrounds.
Eight Justices were Roman Catholic: Roger Taney (appointed in 1835), Edward D. W'hite
(1894),Joseph McKenna (1897), Pierce Butler (1922), Frank Murphy (1939), William Brennan
(1956), Antonin Scalia (1986), and Anthony Kennedy (1987). FiveJustices werejewish: Louis
Brandeis (1916), Benjamin Cardozo (1932), Felix Frankfurter (1939), Arthur Goldberg (1962),

and Abe Fortas (1965). See CONG. Q., GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 794 (2d ed. 1990).
James F. Byrnes, who served as an Associate Justice for only the 1941-1942 term, was born into a
Roman Catholic family, but converted to Episcopalianism when he married in 1906. More recently, two more Jewish Justices have been appointed: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G.
Breyer. Clarence Thomas was born a Baptist, raised a Catholic, began attending an Episcopal
Church, and most recently, returned to Catholicism. In fact, if Thomas is categorized as Catholic, then 1996 marked the first time that a majority of the Justices were not Protestant. See
ILLUSTRATED
MAZUR, supra note 18, at 12, 179 n.3; THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES:
BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993, at 530 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993) (detailing Thomas's religious background through 1993).
42 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1494-1503 (2d ed.
1991) (listing
cases); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 134
(1992) (characterizing the Warren Court as deeply suspicious of Catholicism). Laurence Tribe
argues that this pattern is based on a consistent application of coherent constitutional considerations. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 1219-21. Jeffries and Ryan write:
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[A] ban against aid to religious schools was supported by the great bulk
of the Protestant faithful. With few exceptions, Protestant denominations, churches, and believers vigorously opposed aid to religious schools.
For many Protestant denominations, this position followed naturally
from the circumstances of their founding. It was strongly reinforced,
however, by hostility to Roman Catholics and the challenge they posed to
the Protestant hegemony, which prevailed throughout the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. In its political origins and constituencies,
the ban against aid to religious schools aimed not only to prevent an es43
tablishment of religion but also to maintain one.
The Supreme Court's protection, whether conscious or uncon-

scious, of Protestant interests and values vis-A-vis Catholics can also
help explain First Amendment cases involving religious displays and
practices in the public schools. As Catholic political power grew during the twentieth century, Catholics tended to become more confident of their strength and position in America and thus, particularly
after World War II, began to increase their support for public school
religious displays. Put simply, as Catholics gained more political control over the public schools, they were more willing to have religion
in the schools.4 One does not have to be overly cynical to recognize
The Supreme Court's first concern during this period (1947-1996) was to inhibit aid to
parochial schools. In thirteen cases, the Court considered various programs that would
have eased the financial burden on parents who sent their children to church schools.
The Court allowed reimbursement of transportation expenses, loan of approved textbooks, reimbursement for the costs of state-mandated testing and record-keeping, state
income tax deductions for private-school expenses, and provision of a sign-language interpreter for a disabled child in parochial school. None of these programs offered much
more than incidental support to church schools. Perhaps for that reason, they survived
Supreme Court scrutiny, but just barely. Only the textbook loan program had a vote to
spare; the others, like Everson, divided five-four. More often, the Court struck down attempts to help church schools. Specifically, the Court prohibited state supplements for
the salaries of nonpublic school teachers, tuition reimbursement, maintenance and repair of schools serving low-income students, reimbursement for expenses of statemandated and nonmandated testing, provision of school services and educational
equipment, aid for instructional materials and field trips, and loan of public-school
teachers to teach secular subjects in parochial schools (twice).
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 288-89 (footnotes omitted).
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 282.
44 See Berg, supra note 10, at 126-27 (explaining shifting Catholic and Protestant attitudes
toward religion in the public schools); Klarman, supra note 17, at 57, 60 (discussing Catholic
support for public school religious displays); Morgan, supra note 18, at 81-90, 124-25 (discussing the emergence of Catholic community after World War II and growing Catholic support for
religious displays). Jeffries and Ryan write:
Historically, religious observances in public schools had been distinctly Protestant, and
Catholics objected to them on that ground. In the 1940s, the church changed its mind
and began to call for religious content in public education. The switch sprang in part
from the elimination of Protestant specificity in religious exercises and in part from
growing confidence that Catholic students would not be "lost to the fold" if they said
ecumenical prayer. Partly, however, the change in position was strategic. Catholic leaders began highlighting the secularization of public education in order to bolster the case
for church schools. If public schools could be portrayed as hostile to the devout, the argument for funding religious education would be strengthened.
This strategic
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that the Supreme Court began to question the constitutionality of
these public school religious displays and practices only in this postwar political context. In response to the changing Catholic attitudes
concerning religion in the public schools, many Protestants-not
only Supreme Court Justices-became more wary of public school religious practices and displays for at least two reasons. First, antiCatholic Protestants would resist any Catholic exertion of power in
the public schools, and second, Protestants were increasingly attracted to the idea of a principled strict separation of church and
state to be used as a bulwark against Catholic power, particularly in
the face of Catholic efforts to gain public support for parochial
schools .
Unsurprisingly, some Justices occasionally revealed their Protestant biases in private communications. For instance, at a November
1946 oral argument, Justice William 0. Douglas passed a note to Justice Hugo Black stating that "[i]f the Catholics get public money to
finance their religious schools, we better insist on getting some ood
prayers in public schools or we Protestants are out of business."4 After that same oral argument, Justice Wiley B. Rutledge fretted that
the case was "really a fight by the Catholic schools to secure this
money from the public treasury. It is aggressive and on a wide scale.
There is probably no other group which is either persistent in efforts
to secure this type of legislation or insistent upon it."47 In a case ar-

gued the following term, Justice Robert Jackson asserted at the postoral argument conference that "[t]his cuts the Protestants out of the
motivation was not lost on commentators at the time: an editorial in the New York Post,
for example, suggested that Cardinal Spellman's denunciation of Engel was prompted
"not by the prohibition of a prayer which many churchmen would agree has little religious value, but by the potential impact of the decision on the aid-to-education battle."
That Catholic leaders actually cared more about funding Catholic schools than they did
about keeping religion in the public schools became even more apparent when Catholic
leaders either remained neutral or testified against constitutional amendments to validate school prayer.
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 323-24.
45For a discussion of the Protestant leaders' strong support in favor of the Supreme Court's
decisions banning Bible reading in the public schools, see Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 320.
Professor Berg also notes the trend toward support of separation:
[T]he school aid debate often seemed to drive people's attitudes on other church-state
matters. For example, The Christian Century, the leading mainline Protestant magazine,
reasoned that the Catholic Church would use any method "to blur the principle of separation of church and state," and therefore it was necessary for Americans to "reinforce"
the principle, even to the point of doing away with government-paid chaplains for military servicemen and the inclusion of churches among tax-exempt organizations. The
magazine acknowledged that such programs were sympathetic in themselves, but argued
that they set dangerous precedents for parochial school aid.
Berg, supra note 10, at 126 (footnotes omitted).
46 IN CONFERENCE, supra note 18, at 401 n.26 (discussing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947)).
47McGreevy, supa note 23, at 123-24 (quoting Rutledge's Memo after Conference).
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schools at the same time that we are paying for Catholic schools'
buses. Protestants don't have a good means of standing out."'48 To be
sure, the Justices generally avoided in their public statements such
obvious expressions of pro-Protestant and anti-Catholic attitudes,
though occasionally they would reveal a similar, albeit less overt,
bias. In their judicial opinions, however, the Justices most often explained their Religion Clause decisions with ringing declarations of
principle.
Undoubtedly, the significance of the Protestant-Catholic division
for understanding the judicial enforcement of religious freedom
should not be overstated. Positions on issues of church and state did
not (and still do not) neatly divide with Protestants on one side of the
0
Nonetheless, the fact remains: the
line and Catholics on the other.5
Supreme Court began to enforce the Religion Clauses with vigor only
when Catholics became more politically potent. Given the strong
Protestant sentiments against Catholicism expressed so often
throughout American history, the concurrence of these judicial and
social developments does not seem merely coincidental. Indeed, as
mentioned earlier, the causal connection between the shifting Protestant-Catholic relations and the Court's interpretation of religious
freedom after World War II is the central unifying theme of both the
Jeffries and Ryan article and the Berg article. "The widespread distrust of Catholicism was almost certainly a factor," Berg writes, "in
how the Justices of the Supreme Court decided the first modem Establishment Clause cases."
B. The AmericanJewish Community
A second factor contributing to the Court's increasing solicitude
for First Amendment claims during the postwar era was a change in
American Jewish attitudes and conduct. Throughout most of the
nineteenth century, Jews were an exceedingly small minority in this
country: numbering approximately 4,500 in 1830; 40,000 in 1845;
and still only 150,000 by the Civil War.52 Starting in the 1880s,
though, Eastern European Jews began streaming into the United

48

IN CONFERENCE, supra note 18, at 404 (discussing Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ.,

333 U.S. 203 (1948)).
49 See Berg, supra note 10, at 129 (detailing documented anti-Catholic sentiments
of Supreme CourtJustices); see also McGreevy, supra note 23, at 122-26 (same).
50 See COHEN, supra note 18, at 139, 222; Ira C. Lupu, The LingeringDeath of Separationism,
62
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 230, 231 (1994); cf WUTHNOW, supra note 18, at 73 (noting that many court
cases found Protestants and Catholics on different sides of the fence).
51 Berg, supra note 10, at 127; see alsoJeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 280 (emphasizing the
usefulness of a political view of Establishment Clause cases).
52 LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA 24 (1994).
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States. Between 1887 and 1927, the total number of American Jews
increased from 229,000.to over 4,228,000. Nonetheless, the American Jewish community never amounted overall to more than a small
numerical minority, even at its peak constituting only about three
percent of the total American population.53
Furthermore, overt antisemitism was common and socially accepted in most quarters of American society, at least through World
War II.

54

A few brief examples will suffice.

Throughout the 1920s,

Henry Ford published a newspaper, The Dearborn Independent, that incessantly attacked Jews with traditional antisemitic diatribes, claiming
Jews controlled American banking, American agriculture, American
journalism, and so on. Many Americans must have agreed with Ford,
since The Dearborn Independent increased circulation almost tenfold
within four years to 700,000 copies yer week, only 50,000 less than
the best-selling paper in the country. The Secretary of the Chamber
of Commerce in St. Petersburg, Florida, apparently was one who
shared Ford's sentiments, as he "advocated expelling all Jews and foreigners" from the city in 1924. 56 In the spring of 1936, eight Harvard
Law Review editors had not been offered ajob for the following year;
all were Jewish5' Throughout the 1930s, Jews who fled Germany believed that antisemitism was worse in the United States than in preNazi Germany. 8 In a 1944 poll, twenty-four percent of Americans
identified Jews as the single national, religious, or racial group that
presented the greatest menace or threat to Americans (as a comparison, nine percent identified Japanese, and six percent chose Germans-even though the poll was conducted well before the end of
the war).59 Given such widespread antisemitic sentiments, Jews
tended to avoid asserting their rights and interests either in litigation
or even in political electioneering. Up through the early decades of
the twentieth century, "[a]ssimilation, not ethnocentric demands for
equal rights, [was] the operative norm among the American Jewish
leadership."6° Jews hoped that the nonconfrontational education of
53Klarman,

supra note 17, at 49.

DINNERSTEIN, supra note 52, at 58-149 (explaining the acceptance and evolution of an-

tisemitism in America from the beginning of the twentieth century until the end of World War
II).
:_ Id. at 80-82.
56 Id. at 78.
57 JEROLD S. AUERBACH,

UNEQUAL JUSTICE:

LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN

AMERICA 186 (1976).
58 See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA:
THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY 1186 n.4 (H & R 1962). Seegeneraly MARTINJAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION: A
HISTORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 1923-1950, at 34

(1973) (discussing the wave of antisemitism in Germany).
59 DINNERSTEIN, supranote 52, at
131.
60 IVERS, supra note 18, at 32.
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non-Jews might eventually diminish antisemitic behavior and attitudes. 6' To assert legal rights more directly and energetically, it was
feared, would likely have been counterproductive, engendering reactionary reprisals.62
After World War II, Jews and Jewish organizations-especially the
American Jewish Committee ("AJCommittee"), the Anti-Defamation
League ("ADL"), and the American Jewish Congress ("AJCongress") -stepped forward to press for religious freedom and equality
in the courts. These organizations were buoyed by a reduction of
overt antisemitism in America and spurred by a post-Holocaust sense
of urgency. s The Holocaust painfully demonstrated to American
Jews "the consequences that communal silence had wrought for
European Jewry."
I do not mean to suggest that American Jews
dwelled on the Holocaust and its meaning for them. Instead, they
tended to downplay the Nazis' obsessive destruction of EuropeanJews
partly because of the lingering fear of antisemitism in this country.
An emphasis on the German murder of Jews rather than on wider
Axis wartime atrocities and totalitarianism in general seemed illadvised when West Germany had so quickly become an American ally
in the Cold War battle against the Soviet bloc. 65 To harp on the
Holocaust during the Cold War era might have been viewed as unpatriotic and rekindled traditional antisemitic accusations of Jewish
vengefulness. Nonetheless, partly because of their awareness of the
Holocaust, many American Jews (though certainly not all) became
determined after the war to confront overt antisemitism and Christian proselytizing. Within the leading Jewish organizations, a more
"active, rather than reactive, domestic program of law and social action" was thus called for.66 Consequently, in a substantial number of
the most important postwar Religion Clause cases, the leadingJewish
organizations either instituted the action or participated as amicus
67
curiae.

6I Id. at 40 (explaining that the American Jewish Committee leadership determined that
American antisemitism could best be eradicated by educational work with non-Jewish organizations, stressing thatJews differ from other Americans in religion only).
62 See generally DINNERSTEIN, supra note 52, at 13-57 (discussing antisemitism
in nineteenthcentury America);JAHER, supra note 18, at 129-77, 184-241 (same).
63 For a discussion of the reduction in antisemitism after World War II, see
DINNERSTEIN,

supra note 52, at 150-74; NOVICK, supra note 18, at 113.
64 IVERS, supra note 18, at 49.
65 NOVICK, supra note 18, at 85-102.

66 IVERS, supra note 18, at 49; see also id. at 61 ("The Holocaust brought home ... that American Jews could neither achieve equal civil rights nor ensure the protection of those rights
through
polite appeals to public opinion.").
67
For general discussions, see COHEN, supra note 18, at 123-246; IVERS, supra note
18, at 34188; cf Robert F. Drinan, Mending the Wall, 38 STAN. L. REV. 615 (1986) (discussing the litigation
career of former AJCongress general counsel Leo Pfeffer).
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With regard to specific cases, however, unanimity over such tactics
rarely existed within the Jewish community. Disagreements among
the various Jewish organizations and among Jews from different national regions were common. In the words of one AJCommittee and
ADL attorney, Jews in the South could aim for little more than being
"accepted as honorary Protestants. "68 Even so, for the most part,
American Jews became more assertive of their rights to equality and
religious freedom during the postwar period. In particular, the
AJCongress, with its General Counsel, Leo Pfeffer, most strongly advocated for the strict separation of church and state. "[T] he greatest
danger," according to Pfeffer, "[came]

from those who ... plead

compromise for the sake of good interfaith relations and the avoidance of anti-Semitism." 69
II. SUPREME COURT CASES AND RELIGIOUS OUTSIDERS

The Supreme Court took its first major step toward an increasingly vigorous enforcement of religious freedom when the Court incorporated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses against the
states. Earlier in the twentieth century, the Court had begun to hold
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted
during Reconstruction in 1868, incorporated or implicitly included
various provisions of the Bill of Rights. Pursuant to this so-called "incorporation doctrine," these constitutional provisions then applied
against the state governments just as they applied against the federal
government. 70 The Court did not incorporate the Religion Clauses,
however, until the 1940s. Specifically, under the Court's decisions,
the Free Exercise Clause was incorporated in 1940, and the Establishment Clause was incorporated in 1947.'
A. Establishment Clause Cases
The first case to incorporate and apply the Establishment Clause
against a state or local government was Everson v. Board of Education.
The case challenged an instance of public aid to Catholic schools,
and as such, it presented the Court with an opportunity to confront
the shifting constellation of Catholic-Protestant relations. Signifi-

supra note 18, at 124.
Id. at 56 (quoting Leo Pfeffer).
IVERS,

70 On the incorporation doctrine in general, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 478-86 (2d ed. 2002).
71 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296

(1940).

In Cantwel, the Court wrote:

"The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the

Fourteenth Amendment] embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment."

303.

Id. at
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cantly, then, the Court's opinion reveals the Protestant tilt of the
Court in the face of enhanced Catholic power. Although a bare fiveto-four majority upheld the challenged governmental action, Justice
Black's majority opinion unequivocally declared a robust antiestablishment principle that could thwart other attempts to aid parochial
schools. In particular, the Court explained the meaning of the Religion Clauses, especially the Establishment Clause, by drawing upon
Jefferson's metaphorical wall of separation between church and state:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large

or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation
between church and State.""

Despite then upholding the public reimbursement of transportation costs for children attending either public or Catholic schools,
the Court emphasized that the wall between church and state "must
be kept high and impregnable."73 As Justice Black said afterward, he
had purposefully tailored the opinion: "I made it as tight and gave
them as little room to maneuver as I could. ' 74 He considered the decision no more than a "pyrrhic victory" for those who favored aid to
parochial schools (read: Catholics) .r Plus, as Black wrote to one of
his former clerks, he believed the opinion gave "weight to the basically religious nature of Catholic education.
72 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
73 Id. at 18.
74 ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 363 (2d ed. 1997) (quoting
Hugo Black);

see also Berg, supra note 10, at 127-28 (discussing Black's motivations in crafting the Everson
opinion).
75 NEWMAN, supra note 74,
at 364.

Id. at 682 n.2 (quoting Hugo Black's letter to Charles Luce, Apr. 2, 1947). Black's
son
later commented that the Justice "suspected the Catholic Church." McGreevy, supra note 23, at
124 (quoting HUGO T. BLACK, MY FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 104 (1975)). For a discussion of
other evidence suggesting that Black retained certain anti-Catholic sentiments, see Berg, supra
note 10, at 129. At the Everson post-oral argument conference, Rutledge said: "Once this is
done, the field is wide open and there is no telling where this ends. First it was textbooks, now
buses and transportation, and next it will be lunches and teachers ....
If you can justify this law,
then you can go much further.... Every religious institution in the country will be reaching
76
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The Court for the first time struck down a governmental action as
violating the Establishment Clause in 1948. 77 The case, McCollum v.
Board of Education, involved a challenge to a released time program in
Champaign, Illinois. In this particular program, children were released early from their public school classes once each week so that
they could attend religious classes, which were held in the public
school buildings. Other children, not seeking religious instruction,
were not similarly released from their regular classes. All of the majorJewish organizations, spurred in part by the Everson Court's strong
language concerning a wall of separation, joined together in a show
of unity to file an amicus brief in the name of the Synagogue Council
of America ("SCA") and the National Community Relations Advisory
Council ("NCRAC") .7 To underscore the widespread Jewish support
for the brief, the SCA and NCRAC's Motion for Leave to File Brief as
Amici Curiae claimed that they included "in their membership more
than eighty percent of Americans affiliated with Jewish organizations. "79 They, therefore, professed to "speak for American Jewry." s°
The SCA and NCRAC amicus brief presented a multifaceted argument, but the main thrust was straightforward.8 ' The released time
classes facilitated sectarian religious instruction. The state participated in such religious instruction in a variety of ways, such as by allowing the religious instructors to conduct classes in the public
school buildings during regular class hours. This state participation
violated the Establishment Clause.
More important than the details of this argument, the amicus
brief revealed two interrelated themes or a two-pronged strategy, so
into the hopper for help if you sustain this. It forces people to pay for the religious education
of others. We must stop this thing right at the threshold of the public schools." IN
CONFERENCE, supra note 18, at 401-02. Given Rutledge's other comments, there is little doubt
that the "thing" he wanted to stop was Catholic use of public funds for parochial schools.
McGreevy, supra note 23, at 123-24.
77 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948) (holding that the use of
a "tax-established and tax-supported school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith"
violates the Establishment Clause) .
78 COHEN, supra note 18 at 140-43. For discussions of the increasing use of amicus briefs
during the postwar era, see Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The
Informational Role of Amici Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
APPROACHES 215, 221-22 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); Samuel Krislov,
The Amicus Curiae Brief" From Friendshipto Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963). According to the
historian Naomi Cohen, the McCollum amicus brief "signaled a new assertiveness and confidence on the part of postwar Jews and, simultaneously, a newly found unity among organized
American Jews." COHEN, supra note 18, at 143.
79 Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae, McCollum (No. 90) (no page number in

original).
80 Id.
81 Brief of Amici Curiae Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations
Advisory Council, McCollum (No. 90) at 36-41 [hereinafter McCollum Brief]; see IVERS, supra
note 18, at 78-80 (discussing the amicus brief's argument).
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to speak, that would persist through many of the Jewish organizations' briefs in subsequent post-World War II cases, particularly under
the Establishment Clause. First, the brief framed its arguments to
stress principles, especially principles of American democracy. By invoking principles rather than specific Jewish interests, Jews appeared
to be joined with rather than separated from other Americans. In
fact, still during the war, Jewish leaders had recognized the importance of stressing the similarities, not the differences, between Jews
and others. In a report on antisemitism, the Executive Vice-President
of the AJCommittee had declared that Jewish organizations "should
avoid representing the Jew as weak, victimized, and suffering....
There needs to be an elimination or at least a reduction of horror
stories of victimized Jewry....

We must normalize the image of the

Jew.... The Jew should be represented as like others, rather than
unlike others."8 Unsurprisingly, then, before the Jewish organizations even decided to file the McCollum amicus brief, David Petegorsky of the AJCongress had argued that 'Jews have always been, and
will always be, far better advised to take their position on the basis of
fundamental principle rather than of temporary or immediate considerations of expediency. '
The brief itself began by emphasizing this theme:
We regard the principle of separation of church and state as one of the
foundations of American democracy. Both political liberty and freedom

of religious worship and belief, we are firmly convinced, can remain inviolate only when there exists no intrusion of secular authority in religious affairs or of religious authority in secular affairs. As Americans and
as spokesmen for religious bodies, lay and clerical, we therefore deem
any breach in the wall separating church and state asjeopardizing
- the po-84
litical and religious freedoms that wall was intended to protect.

Given the Jewish organizations' desire to invoke principles, the

Protestant-tinged protectionism that had emerged in the Everson
opinion proved fortuitous. When Justice Black had articulated the
wall-of-separation principle, he aimed in part to fortify Protestant
prerogatives against potential Catholic incursions. The plight and interests of Jews and other non-Christian outsiders probably did not
sway his reasoning"5 Yet, in McCollum and subsequent cases, the Jew82 NOVICK, supra note 18, at 121

(quoting John Slawson, Scientific Research on AntiSemitism, Paper delivered by Executive Vice-President of AJCommittee, at NCRAC (Sept. 11,
1944)).
83 IVERS, supra note 18, at 73 (quoting David Petegorsky); see also id. ("'In opposing any
impairment of the separation of church and state, we stand firmly on sound and tested democratic
principle.'").
84 McCollum Brief, supra note 81, at 1-2.
85 Black had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan during the 1920s, apparently to help his
political ambitions. In one incident, though, he defended a Jewish friend from Klan attempts
to oust him from his job as a school principal. NEWMAN, supra note 74, at 92-94. On occasion,
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ish organizations seized upon Black's language and invoked it to their
advantage. Indeed, the very beginning of the argument section of
the McCollum amicus brief quoted from Everson on the principled wall
86
of separation.
Moreover, to accentuate the focus on principle rather than on
Jewish interests, the brief took two additional tacks. It invoked traditional icons of American-and thus Protestant-religious freedom,
particularly James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, 87 and it emphasized that Christian interests also were at stake in the case. "Jewish
groups," the brief argued, "base their opposition to the released time
program on many grounds, but no consideration bulks larger in that
opposition than the divisive effects of the program. Thoughtful
Christians are no less concerned with this harmful aspect of released
time." 8 An "eminent Protestant observer" was quoted to this effect.89
Moreover, the brief specifically cited to "ample evidence that the
teachings in religious courses foster antagonisms between Christians
and Jews, between Protestants and Catholics and even among various
Protestant sects." 90
The second theme evident in the McCollum amicus brief was that
the strict separation of church and state protects and fosters religion.
"Our opposition to religious instruction within the public school
must in no way be interpreted as hostility to religious instruction as
such."9' The brief then stressed the religiosity within the American
Jewish community, including the community's emphasis on the religious education of Jewish children." Indeed, the brief concluded by
expressly linking together the two themes or strategies. Religiosity
and its protection are part and parcel of American democratic principles: "by protecting religion against the intrusion of civil authority

other Justices openly revealed their indifference toward non-Christians during Court conferences. For instance, during the conference for Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), Chief
Justice Vinson said, "Hence we do not have to pass on all the horribles posed by the appellanti.e., atheists,Jews, Jehovah's Witnesses, etc." IN CONFERENCE, supra note 18, at 405. In the conference involving Sunday closing laws, for example, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961),
Chief Justice Warren said that "somebody is always going to be 'hurt.' Orthodox Jews might
lose two days." IN CONFERENCE, supra note 18, at 393.
86 McCollum Brief, supra note 81, at 13.
87 Id. at 15-16, 29.
88 Id. at 2-3.

89 Id. at 3 n.3.
go Id. at 4. The brief added that Protestant and Catholic children were not treated equally:
"Protestant religious instruction is conducted in the same classroom in which the regular classes
are held, whereas the Catholic children are required to leave the room and go to a basement
room, operates as an obvious preference." Id. at 16.
91 Id. at 5. This theme, that the strict separation of church and state is good
for religion, had
previously been pronounced not only by James Madison but also by Roger Williams. FELDMAN,
PLEASE DON'T, supra note 10, at 128-29, 152-53.
92 McCollum Brief, supra note 81, at 5-6.
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and by making it impossible for the state to become a battleground
for sectarian preference and favor, [the separation of church and
state] has preserved both our political freedom and our religious
freedom. '9
One of the difficulties in the case was that the actual Establishment Clause claimant, Vashti McCollum, was an avowed atheist. This
fact particularly troubled the AJCommittee and the ADL, which led
to the following language in the brief:
We wish to make clear our regret that the appellant chose to use this
case as a medium for the dissemination of her atheistic beliefs and injected into the record the irreligious statements it contains. We wish not
only to disassociate ourselves completely from the anti-religious views of

the appellant, but wish also to deplore the fact that the sponsors of the
original petition chose this case as a means of inscribing such antireligious matter on the public record and for confusing the basic issue in
this case by dragging into it the unrelated issues of atheism versus religion."

Once again, thus, the amicus brief unequivocally declared that the
Jewish organizations themselves were not atheistic but instead supported religion, and that the separation of church and state, as a constitutional principle, would foster rather than inhibit religion.
The Supreme Court held that the Champaign, Illinois, released
time program was unconstitutional, with the SCA and NCRAC amicus
brief apparently playing a significant role. While the brief s influence
was most discernible in Justice Felix Frankfurter's concurrence, 95 the
majority opinion, written again by justice Black, also echoed the brief
in multiple ways. The Court's own language resonated with the main
thrust of the briefs argument. "This [released time program] is beyond all question," the Court wrote, "a utilization of the taxestablished and tax-supported public school system to aid religious
groups to spread their faith. And it falls squarely under the ban of
the First Amendment ....,96 Furthermore, the Court stressed that
there is an American tradition or principle of religiosity and that the
strict enforcement of the principle of religious freedom protects and
even bolsters such religiosity:
To hold that a state cannot consistently with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments utilize its public school system to aid any or all religious
faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines and ideals does not,
as counsel urge, manifest a governmental hostility to religion or religious
93Id. at 41.
94Id. at 6; see IVERS, supra note 18, at 79 (discussing the dispute leading to this language).
95Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212-28 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see COHEN, supra note 18, at 143 (discussing Frankfurter's reliance on the amicus
brief).
96 McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210.
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teachings. A manifestation of such hostility would be at war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the
free exercise of religion. For the First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty
aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere. Or, as
we said in the Everson case, the First Amendment has erected a wall between Church and State which must be kept high and impregnable. 7
Perhaps the Court's strongest statement regarding the ostensible
wall of separation between church and state came more than a decade after McCollum in the context of an Establishment Clause case,
Engel v. Vitale, 8 which challenged prayer in the public schools. The
reading of the Protestant Bible and the recitation of prayers long had
been common practices in public schools across the country.
In
1951, the Board of Regents of New York State had recommended that
local school boards have children recite a prayer each day in school
in order to promote religious commitment and moral and spiritual
values. The Regents recommended the use of a supposedly "nondenominational" prayer.'00 When a town school board adopted this
prayer for use in its classrooms in 1958, several parents decided to
challenge the constitutionality of the practice. The plaintiffs, not yet
supported by any of the Jewish organizations, lost in the state trial
court. But by the time the case reached the United States Supreme
Court, the AJCommittee and the ADL already had joined the fray;
they together filed an amicus brief with the Court. The AJCongress's
Leo Pfeffer, who had strong reservations about the case, eventually
also filed an amicus brief with the Court on behalf of the SCA and
the NCRAC.'0 '
The Jewish organizations' amicus briefs reiterated the two interrelated themes that were central to the McCollum amicus brief. While
the AJCommittee and ADL brief in Engel focused on stare decisis, relying heavily on the Supreme Court's McCollum opinion, the brief also
carefully explained that the strict separation of church and state
benefits religion: "Freedom of religious belief, observance and worship can remain inviolate only so long as there is no intrusion of religious authority in secular affairs or secular authority in religious affairs. 0 2 Meanwhile, the SCA and NCRAC brief declared that it

97 Id. at 211-12.
98 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
99 FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T, supra note 10, at 191, 208,
223.
100Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. The prayer was as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
Country." Id. at 422.
101COHEN, supranote 18, at 168-70.
102 Brief of AmericanJewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as Amici

Curiae at 3, Engel (No. 468); see id. at 9-14 (basing the argument on stare decisis).
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sought the application of the principle of the "absolute separation of
church and state.' ' 3 As the brief explained, enforcement of that
principle by the "[e]xclusion of communal prayer from the public
school curriculum does not manifest a hostility towards religion.' ' 4
To the contrary, the SCA and NCRAC argued that banning prayer in
the public schools would promote religiosity. 01 5 Moreover, this viewpoint did not merely reflect Jewish interests and values; many Christians agreed with them:
This brief is submitted on behalf of the coordinating bodies of 70
Jewish organizations, including the national bodies representing congregations and rabbis of Orthodox, Conservative and Reform Judaism. The
thousands of rabbis and congregations who have authorized the submission of this brief can hardly be characterized as being "on the side of
those who oppose religion." Many Christian groups and publications
have similarly expressed opposition to the Regents' Prayer.106
The Court decided the Engel case in 1962 by holding that the daily
recitation of the Regents' prayer in the public schools violated the Establishment Clause. 0 The Court articulated religious freedom, or
the separation of church and state, as a principled protection of democracy and religion rather than as protection of Jewish or other
minority interests:
When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed
behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. But the purposes underlying the Establishment Clause go
much further than that. Its first and most immediate purpose rested on
the belief that a union of government
and religion tends to destroy gov10 8
ernment and to degrade religion.
Most tellingly, the Engel Court drew upon Protestant history to help
interpret the Establishment Clause. The Puritans, the Court elucidated, had fled England for America in the seventeenth century to
avoid following the governmentally imposed Book of Common
Prayer of the Church of England. 01 9 It was found that the daily recitation of the New York Regents' prayer too closely resembled the official imposition of the English Prayer Book. Finally, the Court exBrief of Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory
Council as Amici Curiae at 3, Engel (No. 468).
104 Id. at 7.
105 The brief stated that it was "committed to the belief that the absolute separation of
103

church and state is the surest guaranty of religious liberty and has proved of inestimable value
both to religion and to the community generally." Id. at 3.
106 Id. at
26.
107 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (finding recitation "wholly
inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause").
108 Id. at 431.
109

Id. at 425-26.
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plained at length that banning public school prayers did not "indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer.""'
Undoubtedly, American Jews-a prototypical religious outgroup-have, to some degree, litigated successfully under the Establishment Clause. By carefully choosing and arguing cases, the Jewish
organizations fruitfully urged the Court to stretch the scope of the Establishment Clause so as to encompass the Jewish positions. The organizations argued that enforcing the strict separation of church and
state was a matter of principle, not merely a matter ofJewish interests,
and that the Jewish organizations favored religiosity. By imposing
strict separationism, the organizations maintained, the First Amendment fostered religion.
Putting this in different words, the Jewish organizations' basic
strategy was to assert their Establishment Clause claims without asking
for any special treatment. "We're just like other Americans," they
seemed to be saying. "We rely on principles, not on our distinctive
interests or values." "And don't forget," they added, "we are just as
religious as other Americans." Understood in this way, success in the
Establishment Clause cases was due in part to the Jewish organizations' ability to advocate for positions that remained reasonably consistent with mainstream Protestant interests and values. Studies in
the art of rhetoric support using this sensible strategy. As a general
matter, an effective advocate "must choose a characterization that ac-

110Id. at 434. The Court wrote:
It has been argued that to apply the Constitution in such a way as to prohibit state
laws respecting an establishment of religious services in public schools is to indicate a
hostility toward religion or toward prayer. Nothing, or course, could be more wrong.
The history of man is inseparable from the history of religion. And perhaps it is not too
much to say that since the beginning of that history many people have devoutly believed
that "More things are wrought by prayer than this world dreams of." It was doubtless
largely due to men who believed this that there grew up a sentiment that caused men to
leave the cross-currents of officially established state religions and religious persecution
in Europe and come to this country filled with the hope that they could find a place in
which they could pray when they pleased to the God of their faith in the language they
chose. And there were men of this same faith in the power of prayer who led the fight
for adoption of our Constitution and also for our Bill of Rights with the very guarantees
of religious freedom that forbid the sort of governmental activity which New York has attempted here. These men knew that the First Amendment, which tried to put an end to
governmental control of religion and of prayer, was not written to destroy either. They
knew rather that it was written to quiet well-justified fears which nearly all of them felt
arising out of an awareness that governments of the past had shackled men's tongues to
make them speak only the religious thoughts that government wanted them to speak
and to pray only to the God that government wanted them to pray to. It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay
out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.
Id. at 433-35 (footnotes omitted).
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tually resonates with her audience.'. When addressing an overwhelmingly Protestant Supreme Court, then, Jewish advocates wisely
characterized their positions as consistent with Protestant views.
Moreover, it is worth reiterating, insofar as Jewish advocates appealed
to Protestant interests and values, those interests and values were, at
the time, partly shaped by Protestant defensive reactions against perceived Catholic political overreaching.
Despite the wisdom of the two-pronged litigation strategy, it did
not lead to unmitigated success. The Jewish organizations lost cases
such as Zorach v. Clauson, a 1952 Establishment Clause case that upheld a released time program where the religious instruction occurred off the public school grounds."l In another 1952 decision,
Doremus v. Board of Education, the Court rejected a challenge to Bible
reading in the public schools by finding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue. 3 And more recently, the infamous Lynch v. Donnelly
upheld the publicl 4 exhibition of a creche as part of an extensive
Christmas display.'

Furthermore, the Jewish organizations sometimes failed not only
in the courtroom but also in the realm of public opinion. The decision in Engel provoked outrage in both the Protestant and Catholic
communities. Local school districts defied the ruling, members of
Congress called for a constitutional amendment overturning the decision, and newspapers published editorials and letters condemning
the Court. ' Indeed, this backlash at least calls into question my conclusion that the Jewish organizations' success in Establishment Clause
cases was partly due to their arguments remaining consistent with
Protestant interests and values.
Nonetheless, this conclusion remains relatively easy to sustain with
regard to a case like McCollum, which struck down a released time
I

Laura E. Little, Characterizationand Legal Discourse, 46J. LEGAL EDUC. 372, 394 (1996); cf

Samuel J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A Look at FreeExercise Law Through a Religious
Minority Perspective,5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 153, 164-65 (1996) (arguing that in cases won by
the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Court tended to emphasize similarities to the mainstream).
112 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
113 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
114 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
115 See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 18, at 171-73; FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T, supra note 10, at 234;

IVERS, supra note 18, at 137. Neal Devins writes:
That there are instances where court opinions seem inconsequential cannot be denied.
Supreme Court decisions limiting religious observance in the public
schools.., are often disregarded. The public school cases demand that objecting students bear the fiscal and emotional toll of challenging school systems that would prefer
to heed religious belief ahead of Supreme Court decisions. This price is quite high and
consequently many religious practices remain unchallenged.
Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1027, 1065 (1992) (reviewing GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)) (footnote omitted).
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program. Most importantly, Catholics participated far more than
Protestants in released time programs.1 6 Thus, unsurprisingly,
Catholic groups most vehemently criticized the Court's decision,
while Protestant groups were divided in their reactions.17 In fact,
during the post-World War II era, Protestants often divided on religious freedom issues, with some favoring a more secular civil society
and others favoring a more religious (read: Protestant) society.
Regardless, and more broadly, any judicial enforcement of the wall of
separation between church and state would, at least in part, temporarily bolster the Protestant defense against Catholic power. From an
admittedly cynical viewpoint, then, the Court's McCollum decision can
be understood, in part, as an expression of indifference or even hostility by the Protestant-controlled Court toward the burgeoning
Catholic population.
A similar argument can be made with regard to Engel. First, while
visible and vocal Protestant leaders such as Billy Graham openly attacked the Court's decision, reaction throughout the Protestant
community was actually mixed, with many Protestants strongly supporting the Court." 9 For instance, the executive director of the BaptistJoint Committee on Public Affairs admitted that "'he was not disturbed by the elimination of 'required prayers' from schools.""'2
Second, while some public school districts, especially in the South,
continued their prayers, such resistance to the Court's ruling was nowhere near as prolonged or intense as in reaction against Brown v.
Board ofEducation'' Third, and related to the previous point, was the
Court's significant reliance on Protestant history. Even if many Protestants contemporaneously opposed the Engel decision, the Court's
opinion underscored that governmentally imposed public school
prayer resonated closely with the Church of England's mandated
Prayer Book, which the early Puritans had so strongly detested. 2 2 Put
See IVERS, supra note 18, at 72 (discussing Leo Pfeffer's study of released time programs).
supra note 18, at 145-46 (describing Protestant and Catholic reactions).
18 See HAMBURGER, supra note 10, at 476-78 (discussing Protestant
divisions, especially after
the McCollum decision).
119 COHEN, supra note 18, at 172 (noting that the overall Protestant reaction was mixed de16

17 COHEN,

spite these leaders' influence); see also IVERS, supra note 18, at 141-42 ("[M]any Christians will
welcome the decision [because] it protects the rights of minorities and guards against the development of public school religion which is neither Christianity nor Judaism but something
less than either."); Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 320-21 (explaining that "the vast majority
of Protestant leaders and organizations" supported decisions excluding prayer and Bible reading in public schools).
12 IVERS, supra note 18, at 141 (quoting C. Emanuel Carlson).
121 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The less intense resistance to the prayer decision may have
been
partly due to the ambivalence of Protestants. See Klarman, supra note 17, at 15-16 (discussing
the minimal resistance to the Court's prohibition on prayer and Bible reading).
1
See FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T, supra note 10, at 81-83, 119-24 (discussing the Book of Common Prayer,Puritanism, and motivations for American settlement).
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differently, while the Court's decision may have departed from some
contemporary Protestant opinion, the decision harmonized with
Protestant values and interests, when understood from a broader historical perspective. Finally, the Jewish organizations may have once
again benefited from the shifting forces of the Protestant and Catholic political constellations. In particular, during the postwar era,
Catholic support for public school religious practices, including
prayer, increased dramatically. 2 3
One reason for this increased
Catholic support was that the enhanced Catholic political power ensured that public school prayers would be less overtly Protestant.
Prayers, in other words, would supposedly be nondenominational.
Because of this increased Catholic support for public school prayers,
there is a reasonable likelihood that the Protestant-controlled Supreme Court would be less protective of the practice than it would
have been in earlier decades. 24
Hence, the importance for the Jewish organizations to articulate
their Establishment Clause claims consistently with Protestant interests and values should not be gainsaid. In fact, in School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp,12' a case decided only one year after
Engel, the organizations used the same two-pronged strategy to successfully challenge Bible reading as well as the recitation of the
Lord's prayer in public schools. The amicus brief of the AJCommittee and ADL emphasized "the principle of separation of church and
state as expressed in the First Amendment. ,
Moreover, the brief
argued that the Jewish organizations' constituencies not only were religious people but that their views regarding religious freedom echoed Christian views. The brief quoted Paul Hutchinson, onetime editor of the ChristianCentury, in stating that "'the American adoption of
the principle of church and state separation has been a godsend for
the churches, Protestant, Roman Catholic and of every sort." ' 2

7

The

amicus brief for the SCA and NCRAC, in relying heavily on stare de-

123

SeeMILLER, supra note 6, at 277-78 (noting the strong Catholic support for NewYork
pub-

lic school prayer).
14 Michael Klarman writes that while the Court's prohibition
of public school prayers and
Bible reading "plainly were contrary to the preferences of a national majority, they were not
dramatically countermajoritarian, which is what they would have been had the Court rendered
them a generation earlier." Klarman, supra note 17, at 16.
125 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding in-school Lord's
Prayer recitation unconstitutional under
the Establishment Clause).
126 Brief of American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith as Amici
Curiae at 3, Schempp (No. 142).
127 Id. at 4 (quoting Paul Hutchinson, The Onward March of ChristianFaith, LIFE, Dec. 26, 1955,
at 43).
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cisis, argued similarly.18 Enforcement of strict separationism, the
brief stated, "is the surest guaranty of religious liberty and has proved
of inestimable value both to religion and to the community generally. ,2 9 Banning Bible reading and the Lord's Prayer would "not
manifest hostility to religion." 3 Moreover, "many Christian groups
and publications... have similarly expressed opposition" to these
practices in the public schools. 3
Apparently in response to the widespread criticisms of the Engel
decision from the previous term, the Schempp amicus briefs tried, if
anything, to augment their willingness to reconcile their positions
with the mainstream Protestant views. They struck an even more accommodationist chord by explicitly acknowledging that religion
could be studied as a secular subject in the public schools. The SCA
and NCRAC brief stated:
The complaints in these actions do not demand, nor do the plaintiffs assert, any right to the complete exclusion of religion or reference to God
from the public schools. Nothing in the Constitution of the United
States requires the school authorities to remove all matter relating to religion from the school curriculum. It is not contended that, for example,
the Bible may not be studied in the public schools as a work of literature.... Nor is it contended that the influence of religion and religious
32
institutions upon history may not be studied in the public schools.

128For example, the brief emphasized the Everson wall-of-separation language and
the
McCollum holding. Brief of Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations
Advisory Council as Amici Curiae at 8-11, Schempp (No. 142).
2 Id. at
4.
130 Id. at 35. The brief
adds:
[Striking down the state actions here] would not in any way infringe upon the religious
liberty of children or their parents. It would not prevent any child from reading the Bible or reciting any prayer he wished during public school hours, provided of course he
did not thereby intefere with the regular course and discipline of instruction. Rather
than restrict religious liberty, such a determination would further it, since it would substitute freedom of individual choice for State-imposed conduct. In American tradition,
religion is a matter of individual choice; the First Amendment was written because the
people did not want their religious beliefs and practices to be established by law or imposed by government. Invalidation of the regulations here challenged would place the
responsibility for religious exercises where it properly belongs-in the home, the church,
the synagogue and on the individual conscience.
Id. at 37.
131 Id. at 36.
132 Id. at 19-20. The SCA and NCRAC
brief added:
It is constitutional to study the Bible as a work of literature; it is, we contend, unconstitutional to read it as an act of devotion. If the approach to the Bible or religious music or
art is as an intellectual study, it is proper in the public schools; if the approach is worship
or faith, it belongs in the home, church and synagogue.
Id. at 20. The AJCommittee and ADL brief likewise took the position that the Bible could be
used in "the context of instruction of such subjects as literature, art, history and social studies."
Brief of American Jewish Committee and Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as Amici Curiae at 18, Schiempp (No. 142).
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The Jewish organizations, in other words, stressed that they sought to
eradicate sectarian religious practices, but not religion per se, from
the public schools.
B. Free Exercise Clause Cases
While the Jewish organizations developed and used a moderately
effective strategy in the Establishment Clause cases, they were not as
successful in articulating or implementing a similar approach in free
exercise cases. The most common type of free exercise case is probably the exemption claim: a member of a religious group-almost always a minority or outgroup-seeks an exemption (or exception)
from a generally applicable law that burdens the exercise of her religion.
Who wins such free• exercise
cases? As a general matter, most free
131
exercise claimants lose.
More specifically, in an empirical study of
free exercise cases in the United States courts of appeals, James C.
Brent reports that "claimants who belonged to mainstream Catholic
and Protestant sects were more likely to win than were claimants who
belonged to other religions (38.9% versus 24.5%). '114 In free exercise

exemption cases at the Supreme Court level, the numbers are even
more striking: while members of small Christian sects sometimes win
and sometimes lose such free exercise claims, non-Christian religious
outsiders never win.'

Brent speculates:

133 Brent, supra note 28, at 249-50 (reporting from a study of the courts
of appeals); Way &
Burt, supra note 28, at 661-62 (reporting from a study of state and federal decisions between
1970 and 1980). According to Jesse H. Choper, "[t]he bedrock test of a government's commitment to protecting the free exercise of religion arises when general government regulations,
enacted for secular purposes, conflict with an individual's religious beliefs." Choper, supra note
13, at 1713 (footnote omitted).
IN Brent, supra note 28, at 250-51. For an interesting analysis of free exercise cases involving
Jehovah's Witnesses, see MAZUR, supra note 18, at 28-61. Mazur explains that between 1938
and 1960, the Jehovah's Witnesses won a majority of the more than fifty cases that their members brought before the United States Supreme Court. Yet, their success arose from those cases
where they focused on free speech claims or they combined free speech with free exercise
claims. Id. at 30, 45, 47, 50-51. Mazur concludes that the Jehovah's Witnesses were "singularly
unsuccessful" in cases involving only free exercise claims. Id. at 54.
135 As I have written elsewhere:
I refrain from categorically asserting that non-Christians never win any free exercise
cases because a few cases are ambiguous enough to render such a bald assertion at least
questionable. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). Some of
these cases involve religions that may or may not be categorized as Christian, depending
on the definition of Christianity. None of the cases, though, can be reasonably categorized as involving the enforcement of a free exercise exemption on an otherwise generally applicable law. For example, in Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), a non-Christian
seemed to win a free exercise case where the government explicitly and overtly discriminated against the exercise of Buddhism. The Court held that the lower court should not
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America is a predominantly Christian nation. It therefore is not unreasonable to suppose that Christians should receive preferential treatment
at the hands of the Court. Christians probably are less likely to find that
the exercise of their religion is burdened by laws in the first place. Because of the majoritarian process, lawmakers are less likely to adopt laws
that place burdens on adherents of Christianity, the majority religion. If,
however, Christians do find themselves in court defending the exercise of
their religion, the judiciary is likely to be receptive to their claims. Primarily, this is because Christian judges should be more likely to be sympathetic to the plight of fellow Christians. The religious burden may appear more "substantial," or the governmental interests may seem less
"compelling" when they burden Christians than when they burden nonshould prevail more often
Christians. Therefore, mainstream Christians
136
than non-Christians in free exercise cases.

The majority opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 137 which involved the
Old Order Amish, illustrates the importance of Christianity for a successful free exercise exemption claim. The Amish impressed the
Yoder Court with their "devotion to a life in harmony with nature and
the soil, as exemplified by the simple life of the early Christian era
that continued in America during much of our early national life."3
The Court seemed especially receptive to the Amish's claim for a free
exercise exemption from a state compulsory education law because
they were able to appeal to the Justices' romantic nostalgia for a
mythological past-for a simple Christian America. This national
and Christian past was one that most of the Justices (as Protestants)
could readily understand; its meaning corresponded with the religious and cultural backgrounds of the Justices themselves. At the
post-oral argument conference, Chief Justice Warren Burger commented: "This is an ancient religion, not a new cult.... Being raised
on an Amish farm is equal to or better than vocational school train-

have dismissed Cruz's complaint for failure to state a claim when allegations asserted that
Cruz was a Buddhist and "denied a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious
precepts." Id. at 322. Even in that case, I refrain from asserting that Cruz, as a nonChristian, outright won the case because of its procedural posture. Since the lower court
had dismissed for failure to state a claim without benefit of a trial, the case presented the
free exercise violation as a conditional or hypothetical, the validity of which would therefore depend on the further development of facts at trial. Cruz thus might have an opportunity to present evidence at a trial, but after such a trial, he might then win or lose.
Moreover, in dissent, Justice Rehnquist even suggested that Cruz, proceeding in forma
pauperis, might still have the complaint dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(d). Id. at 328 (RehnquistJ., dissenting). On the importance of Christianity to free
exercise claims, see Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland
Revisited, 1989 SuP. CT. REV. 373, 381.
Feldman, supra note 9, 261, 273-74 n.5.
136 Brent, supra note 28, at 248.
1.'7406 U.S. 205
(1972).
13 Id. at
210.
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ing."5 9 Thus, whereas non-Christian religious outsiders have difficulty convincing the Court that their religious convictions are sincere
and meaningful, the Yoder majority opinion, written by Burger,
quoted the New Testament in reasoning that "the traditional way of
life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but
one of deep religious conviction."1 40 Because the Amish were Christians, the Court could easily relate their way of life to Christian society
and Christian history. "Whatever their idiosyncrasies as seen by the
majority, this record strongly shows that the Amish community has
been a highly successful social unit within our society, even if apart
from the conventional 'mainstream.' Its members are productive and
very law-abiding members of society. .. 4.
The Court consequently sympathized with the free exercise exemption claim of the Amish in Yoder far more than the Court has ever
done with the claims of non-Christian outsiders, whether Jews, Muslims, or otherwise. For example, in OLone v. Estate of Shabazz, the
Court held that prison officials did not need to grant a free exercise
exemption from regulations that prevented Muslim prisoners from
attending certain religious services. 4 Likewise, in Employment Division
v. Smith, the Native American respondents sought to consume peyote
as part of the supervised rituals of the Native American Church, but
the Court held that the state did not need to grant an exception from
a criminal law prohibiting peyote use.143
The Smith Court also stressed a constitutional distinction between
religious beliefs and conduct (or actions)-a distinction that parallels
Protestant doctrine. The Free Exercise Clause, according to the
Smith Court, precludes all governmental regulations of religious beliefs but does not similarly preclude governmental restrictions on
conduct-such as the use of peyote-even if the conduct arises from
religious convictions. A governmental prohibition on particular re-

139

IN CONFERENCE, supra note 18, at 437.

406 U.S. at 216.
Id. at 222. The Court explicitly stressed the long history and traditional culture of the
Amish (as Christians) as significant to the decision: "It cannot be overemphasized that we are
not dealing with a way of life and mode of education by a group claiming to have recently discovered some 'progressive' or more enlightened process for rearing children for modem life."
Id. at 235.
1
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). For a discussion (including analyses of
lower court cases) of the rights of Jewish prisoners to wear beards, yarmulkes, and eat kosher
food, see Abraham Abramovsky, First Amendment Rights of Jewish Prisoners: Kosher Food, Skullcaps,
and Beards, 21 AM.J. CRIM. L. 241 (1994).
143Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In rejecting another First Amendment
claim, the Court in Bowen v. Roy held that the government did not need to grant a free exercise
exemption to a Native American who sought to prevent the government from using his daughter's social security number as a precondition for granting welfare benefits. 476 U.S. 693
(1986).
140

141
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ligiously motivated conduct would be unconstitutional only if the
government
• 144restricted that conduct exactly because of its religious
foundation .
The difficulty for Jews and other non-Christian outsiders in free
exercise cases can be understood best if one recalls the Jewish organizations' strategy in Establishment Clause cases. Their basic approach
was to advocate for positions that remained reasonably consistent
with mainstream Protestant interests and values. They argued, in effect, that they were asking for nothing special. This strategy, though,
is practically impossible to articulate in the free exercise exemption
scenario. In fact, the nature of a free exercise exemption claim
forces the claimant to do the exact opposite: to explain to the Court
how her religious beliefs or practices differ from the mainstream. It
is, after all, this difference that creates a free exercise problem in the
first place, since laws of general applicability rarely interfere with
mainstream Protestant or Catholic practices or beliefs. The claimant,
then, must ask the Court for special treatment to accommodate her
religious difference.
Unsurprisingly, the Court on multiple occasions has rejected the
free exercise claims of Jewish litigants-litigants who needed to describe their unusual religious practices (unusual, that is, from a Christian perspective). For example, in Goldman v. Weinberger, an Orthodox Jewish Air Force officer, Simcha Goldman, sought a free exercise
exemption so that he could wear his yarmulke (skull-cap) in spite of
Air Force regulations. 45 Jewish organizations submitted two amicus
briefs, one filed by the ADL and one filed by the AJCongress. 146 As
was true in Goldman's petitioner's brief, both amicus briefs explained the practice and importance within Judaism of wearing a
yarmulke. The ADL brief stated that "[a]s an Orthodox Jew, [Goldman] wore at all times, as he has done throughout his life, a diminutive head-covering known as a 'yarmulke' in fulfillment of ajewish re144The

Smith Court wrote:
[A] State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" if it sought to ban such
acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because
of the religious belief that they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of "statues that are to be used for worship purposes," or to
prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.
494 U.S. at 877-78; accord Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993) (holding that a city violated the Free Exercise Clause when the city prohibited animal sacrifices for the very purpose of discriminating against the Santeria religion); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (relying on a belief/conduct dichotomy to uphold
polygamy conviction against a Mormon despite free exercise challenge); see also Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Courts Free ExerciseJurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failureto Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (1993) (emphasizing the importance of the distinction between belief and conduct in the Court's free exercise cases).
145 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
146See infra notes 147-48.
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ligious requirement that he keep his head covered at all times.
The brief elaborated:
The religious practice of wearing a yarmulke, a head covering worn
by observantJews, is of ancient origin. References to the practice appear
in the Talmud, an authoritative compendium ofJewish law completed by
approximately 500 C.E. The practice has been firmly established since
the Middle Ages. For example, Maimonides wrote in his classic 12th century philosophical treatise, The Guide to the Perplexed, that "The great men
among our Sages would not uncover their heads because they believed
that God's glory was round them and over them...." And Rabbi S. R.
Hirsch wrote in his 19th century commentary on the Jewish Siddur
(prayer book), that "[t]he Jew symbolically expresses [submission to
covered, and in this subordination to God he
God] by keeping his 1head
48
finds his own honor."
Because Air Force regulations sometimes prohibited the wearing
of a head covering, the briefs argued that Goldman's Jewish, and
therefore unusual, practice of wearing a yarmulke required the granting of a free exercise exemption. Significantly, in struggling to make
its argument, the petitioner's brief stressed that the case was not a
matter of broad principle, or in the briefs words, "a broad constitutional declaration of right.' 149 Rather, Goldman's claim "rests on a
careful and particularized appraisal of the personal and nonintrusive
The brief, that is, pracnature of the religious observance at issue. ,
tically begs the Court to focus on Goldman's unique situation, due to
Finally, the AJCongress brief underscored
his Jewish practices.
Goldman's dilemma, one faced by most free exercise claimants: "Because petitioner sincerely holds the religious belief that he must keep
his head covered at all times, strict enforcement of [the Air Force
regulations] forces petitioner-or any other Orthodox Jew-to
choose between adhering to his religious' 15beliefs or serving his coun1
try in the Air Force. It is 'a cruel choice."
Strikingly,
The Supreme Court rejected Goldman's claim.
whereas the Yoder Court had sympathized readily with the Christian
religious tenets of the Amish, the Goldman Court mistakenly charac-

147 Brief of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as Amicus Curiae at 3, Goldman (No. 84-

1097).

148 Id. at 3 n.2 (citations omitted); see also Brief for Petitioner at 11-12, Goldman (No. 84-

1097) (explaining the practice of wearing a yarmulke); Brief of American Jewish Congress on
Behalf of Itself, the Synagogue Council of America, and the American Civil Liberties Union as
Amici Curiae at 4-5, Goldman (No. 84-1097) (describing Goldman's practice of wearing a yarmulke).
149 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Goldman (No. 84-1097).
150 Id.
151 Brief of American Jewish Congress on Behalf of Itself, the Synagogue Council of America,
and the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae at 9, Goldman (No. 84-1097) (quoting
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
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terized the wearing of a yarmulke as a matter of mere "personal preference[].' 5 2 But as the amicus briefs had detailed, wearing a yarmulke is not a personal preference or choice for an Orthodox Jew. It
is a centuries-old custom that has attained the status of religious law.
Apparently, the majority of the Goldman Justices-and all of the Justices at this time were Christian-were unable (or unwilling) to 5com3
prehend the religious significance of this non-Christian practice.
Two cases decided in 1961 arose from Jewish religious challenges
to Sunday closing laws, from Massachusetts and Pennsylvania respectively. Among other assertions, these cases involved claims for free
exercise exemptions that would have allowed Jewish-owned businesses to remain open on Sundays. 154 The Massachusetts Sunday law
included an impressively long list of exceptions:
[The Sunday law forbids] under penalty of a fine of up to fifty dollars,
the keeping open of shops and the doing of any labor, business or work
on Sunday. Works of necessity and charity are excepted as is the operation of certain public utilities. There are also exemptions for the retail
sale of drugs, the retail sale of tobacco by certain vendors, the retail sale
and making of bread at given hours by certain dealers, and the retail sale
of frozen desserts, confectioneries and fruits by various listed sellers. The
statutes under attack further permit the Sunday sale of live bait for noncommercial fishing; the sale of meals to be consumed off the premises;
the operation and letting of motor vehicles and the sale of items and
emergency services necessary thereto; the letting of horses, carriages,
boats and bicycles; unpaid work on pleasure boats and about private gardens and grounds if it does not cause unreasonable noise; the running of
trains and boats; the printing, sale and delivery of newspapers; the operation of bootblacks before 11 a.m., unless locally prohibited; the wholesale
and retail sale of milk, ice and fuel; the wholesale handling and delivery
of fish and perishable foodstuffs; the sale at wholesale of dressed poultry;
the making of butter and cheese; general interstate truck transportation
before 8 a.m. and after 8 p.m. and at all times in cases of emergency; in-

152

Goldman, 475 U.S. at 508. The Court wrote: "The considered professional judgment of

the Air Force is that the traditional outfitting of personnel in standardized uniforms encourages
the subordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of the overall group mission."
Id. The Amish, it is worth noting, do not always win. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252
(1982) (holding that the Amish are not constitutionally exempt on religious grounds from paying social security taxes).
153 See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 508 (1986); But see id. at 525 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (discussing the importance of the yarmulke in Orthodox Judaism); ROY A. ROSENBERG, THE CONCISE
GUIDE TOJUDAISM 124-25 (1990) (discussing the importance ofa yarmulke).
1
See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 622,
630-31
(1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608-09 (1961) (discussing the potential problems
involved in creating an exception to Sunday labor laws). The Court actually decided four cases
involving Sunday laws, though only two involved Jewish religious challenges. The other cases
were brought for commercial reasons.
See Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). For a discussion of
the cases, see COHEN, supra note 18, at 226-32.
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trastate truck transportation of petroleum products before 6 a.m. and after 10 p.m.; the transportation of livestock and farm items for participation in fairs and sporting events; the sale of fruits and vegetables on the
grower's premises; the keeping open of public bathhouses; the digging of
clams; the icing and dressing of fish; the sale of works of art at exhibitions; the conducting of private trade expositions between 1 p.m. and 10
p.m.
... Permission is granted by local option for the Sunday operation
after 1 p.m. of amusement parks and beach resorts, including participa55
tion in bowling and games of amusement for which prizes are awarded.
Incredibly, the list of exceptions continued on (and on) even further,
but there was no exemption for Orthodox Jews or others whose religious convictions demanded that they observe the Sabbath on Saturday.
Jewish organizations were pessimistic about challenging even this
Massachusetts statute. Somewhat to their surprise, then, the district
court struck down the law as violating both religion clauses. "What
Massachusetts has done," the judge wrote, "is to furnish special protection to the dominant Christian sects which celebrate Sunday as the
Lord's Day, without furnishing such protection in their religious observances to those Christian sects and to Orthodox and Conservative
Jews who observe Saturday as the Sabbath, and to the prejudice of the
latter group.' 56 Such a sensitive statement sparked optimism among
the Jewish organizations.
In arguing the free exercise claims before the Supreme Court, the
Jewish claimants' briefs as well as an amicus brief for the SCA and
NCRAC explained, by necessity, the specific religious practices of the
Orthodox Jewish claimants. For instance, the appellants' brief in the
Pennsylvania case quoted extensively from the Hebrew Bible and Jewish scholars as it devoted several pages to its explanation of "the cardinal importance of the Sabbath institution to Orthodox Judaism." 57
Interestingly, the amicus brief first stated, in a similar vein, that "the
appellees in the Crown Kosher case and the appellants in Braunfeld v.
Gibbons are Orthodox Jews who observe the seventh day of the week
as their Sabbath and refrain from all secular business and labor on
that day.", 58 In the very next paragraph, however, the amicus brief attempted to invoke the same strategy that had worked effectively in Establishment Clause cases. The brief declared that the claimants re-

15

Gallagher,366 U.S. at 619-20.

156

COHEN, supra note 18, at 227 (quotingJudge Calvert Magruder).

Appellants' Brief at 10, Braunfeld v. Gibbons, affd sub nom. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961) (No. 67); seeAppellees' Brief at 2-3, Gallagher(No. 11).
1
Brief of Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory
Council as Amici Curiae at 4, Braunfeld (No. 67).
157
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lied on the principle of religious freedom and that they were not
concerned solely withJewish interests and values:
[O]ur concern extends beyond the interests of the particular parties to
this litigation. We would be concerned even if Braunfeld and the proprietors of Crown Kosher were notJews or observers of the seventh day of
the week as the Sabbath. We believe that the principle of religious liberty
is impaired if any person is penalized for adhering to his religious beliefs,
or for not adhering to any religious belief, so long as he neither interferes with the rights of others nor endangers the public peace or security.159

Regardless of this strategic effort to render the free exercise claim
more ecumenical, the gist of the claimants' arguments was one of religious difference. As the Pennsylvania appellants' brief specified,
"there is no real relationship between the Jews' Sabbath and the
Christians' Sunday. While the latter arose out of the former, they are
" 6
' 0
not the same either in conception or in manner of observance.
For that reason, the claimants requested exemptions from the Sunday laws so that Orthodox Jews could observe their Sabbath without
being penalized.16 ' As the amicus brief wryly suggested, however,
granting an exemption to Orthodox Jews could not interfere any
more with the religious character of Sundays than did professional
162
sporting events, which the Massachusetts statute expressly allowed.
The Jewish organizations' optimism, spurred by the lower court's
decision in the Massachusetts case, went unrequited. During the
post-oral argument conference, Chief Justice Warren indifferently
brushed aside potential injuries to religious outsiders: "[S]omebody
is always going to be 'hurt.' Orthodox Jews might lose two days.,13
Given such an attitude, the Court unsurprisingly upheld the Sunday
laws in both cases and refused to mandate exemptions for the Orthodox Jewish claimants!' A plurality opinion in the Massachusetts case
reasoned that Sunday laws merely regulate secular activities. As such,
159 Id.

160Appellant's Brief at 13, Braunfeld (No. 67); see also Appellees' Brief at 13, Gallagher (No.
11) (explaining that the Lord's Day is no longer adopted to make everyone rest on the same
day). The Appellants' Brief then emphasized the dilemma that most free exercise claimants
face: choosing between following one's religion or following the law.
The special vice of the statute now before the Court is the choice it puts to the Sabbatarian businessman: To give up his Sabbath observance and thus his faith or to go out
of business or, at least, suffer serious economic loss. And it is the statute, not appellants'
religion, which is the cause of this dilemma.
Appellant's Brief at 14, Braunfeld (No. 67).
irlBrief of Synagogue Council of America and National Community Relations Advisory
Council as Amici Curiae at 31, Braunfeld (No. 67).
162 Id. at 31-32.
163IN CONFERENCE, supra note 18, at 393.
164 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.

599 (1961).
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they do not force a "choice [on] the individual of either abandoning
his religious principle or facing criminal prosecution ....

[T] he stat-

'6
ute at bar does not make unlawful any religious practices. ' 5
In sum, these free exercise cases reveal that Jews and other nonChristian religious outsiders have not fared well when seeking free
exercise exemptions from generally applicable laws. Even when the
Jewish organizations attempted to advocate consistently with the
mainstream Christian interests and values, they were rebuked. Unfortunately, the crux of the claimant's free exercise argument is precisely that her religion diverges from the mainstream Christian views.
That divergence, then, compels the claimant to request special recognition or treatment, in the form of a free exercise exemption.'66 In
effect, the free exercise claimant asks the Court to create an exception from the mainstream or normal understanding of religion and
religious freedom, as manifested in the generally applicable laws as
well as in previous Supreme Court decisions. In all such cases involving non-Christian outsiders, the Court implicitly concluded that the
claimants' religious freedom already was protected adequately.
These outsiders, according to the Court, neither required nor were
entitled to any further constitutional shelter.

C. Lessons From Histoiy
In light of the history of the postwar establishment and free exercise cases, Religion Clause litigants obviously would be wise to frame
their claims, whenever possible, as establishment rather than free exercise issues.'
Indeed, further analysis suggests a deeper point. Regardless of what Religion Clause provision is invoked, one should
avoid constructing arguments that accentuate differences from the
mainstream. The more that a First Amendment claimant stresses her
divergence from mainstream religious views, the less the Supreme
Court is likely to rule in her favor. This point, however troubling, is

165

Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605.

166A statement from the petitioner's brief in Goldman underscores that the crux of a
free ex-

ercise claim is religious difference:
According to many respected rabbinical authorities, Jewish law requires observant men
to keep their heads covered at all times. The religious obligation may be satisfied by
wearing a yarmulke-a skull-cap that is universally recognizable as a form of religious observance. This case concerns the constitutional power of government to forbid an individual from observing this religious duty while he serves as a psychologist at an Air Force
hospital.
Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (No. 84-1097).
167 Phillip E. Johnson has recognized that "many significant problems
can be categorized so
as to fall under the rule of either the establishment clause or the free exercise clause." Phillip E.
Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in FirstAmendment Religious Doctrine,72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 82122 (1984) (discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of several Religion Clause cases).
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one's

membership in significant social groups greatly determines values
and perceptions. "[I]ngroup favoritism and outgroup hostility are
seen as consequences of the unit formation between self and other
ingroup members and the linking of one's identity to them."6 As
soon as a non-Christian Religion Clause claimant stresses her differences from Christianity, she apparently diminishes her likelihood for
success before a Christian-dominated Supreme Court.
Of course, in a free exercise case, a claimant would be hardpressed not to emphasize religious difference, since that difference is
precisely the crux of the claim. But in an Establishment Clause case,
there might be considerable leeway for strategically presenting one's
position. Lynch v. Donnelly, which involved the public display of a
creche,1 69 illustrates the dire consequences that can follow when religious differences are amplified rather than diminished, even in an
Establishment Clause context. The amicus brief of the ADL and
AJCongress provided the following information regarding the nativity
scene vis-A-vis Christians andJews:
This religiously based depiction of the birth of the Christian Messiah is
one of the most fundamental religious symbols to Christians and Jews.
For Christians it provides basic religious definition-Christians accept
the birth of Jesus as the birth of the Messiah. "The Christian faith... is
based on the mystery of the Incarnation ....The Christian Incarnation
means that God was incarnate in the human person of... Jesus of Nazareth .... " "The most fundamental affirmation of Christian faith is the
belief that Jesus is the Christ ....On this affirmation everything else in
Christian theology is built. To ask about this affirmation is to ask about
the keystone of Christian faith."
Just as fundamental to Jewish thought is the "non-incarnation of
God." "The God in whom Jews] believe, to whom UJews] are pledged,
does not unite with human substance on earth." Further, Jews believe in
the inseparability of the coming of the Messiah with the coming of the
168Norman

Miller & Marilynn B. Brewer, CategorizationEffects on Ingroup and Outgroup Perception, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACIsM 209, 213 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986); see also DAvID G. MYERS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 502-04 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing
ingroup-outgroup relations); GENEVIEVE PAICHELER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE
151 (Angela St. James-Emler & Nicholas Emler trans., 1988) ("What is perceived to be most salient about a minority is its difference and not the content of its arguments. Its arguments are
accorded meaning first in terms of the minority position they occupy, not in terms of what they
express.").
Other psychologists argue that a person is more likely to empathize with another who seems
similar. See EZRA STOTLAND ET AL., EMPATHY AND BIRTH ORDER 125 (1971) (discussing the correlation between empathy for, and perceived similarity of, another). Still other psychologists
argue that people who argue against their own self-interest are generally deemed more credible. See MYERS, supra note 168, at 279-80. It would follow, then, that when Religion Clause
claimants overtly specify their own unique religious interests, the Supreme CourtJustices would
be less likely to pay heed.
16 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Messianic Age and, thus, cannot accept the Christian conception ofJesus
as the Messiah.
Emerging from these fundamentally disparate Christian and Jewish
beliefs is a basic difference between these two religions concerning the
messianic nature ofJesus. It has been described by theologians as part of
the "ultimate division between Judaism and Christianity." This would
have remained merely a theological difference if it were not for the reaction, throughout history, to the Jewish non-acceptance of the Christian
belief in the Messiah. Discreditation ofJewish beliefs by linking the nonacceptance of Jesus as the Messiah to the punishment of the wandering
of Jews, together with forced conversion of Jews, were the historic responses to thejudaic non-acceptance ofJesus as the Messiah. 70
This information is interesting, accurate, and important, at least
for someone interested in Jewish-Christian relations. It also manifested a monumental strategic miscalculation. The amici apparently
intended to stress to the Court how the symbolism of the creche crystallized the religious division between Christianity and Judaism. The
idea thatJesus was born as the Messiah, as God incarnate, is central to
Christianity and denied by Judaism. But this information did not impress the Court. Despite the amici's argument, the Court found that
the creche, as publicly displayed, was secular and therefore constitutional. The implication is disturbingly clear: emphasizing religious
divergence from the mainstream in a Religion Clause case, whether
under the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause, is unlikely to engender the Court's empathy. To the contrary, divergence seems to
induce judicial indifference or even hostility.
III. THE FUTURE OF RELIGION CLAUSE CASES
This Part has three Sections. The first examines current Supreme
Court doctrine under, in turn, the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause. The second recommends certain doctrinal innovations designed to benefit religious outsiders. The final Section then
relates both the current doctrine and my doctrinal recommendations
to the history detailed in Parts I and II.
A. CurrentSupreme CourtDoctrine
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, a 1971 decision, the Court synthesized previous Establishment Clause cases into a three-part test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits relig-

170

Brief of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and American Jewish Congress as Amici

Curiae at 9-10, Lynch (No. 82-1256) (citations omitted) (quotingJULES ISAAC, THE TEACHING OF
CONTEMPT 118 (1962) and ROSEMARY REDFORD REUTHER, FAITH AND FRATRICIDE 246 (1974)).
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ion; ... finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government

entanglement with religion.". 7. The Court has since applied the
Lemon test many times and, despite criticisms, has never expressly and
fully repudiated it.
Different Justices, though, have introduced and applied alternative doctrines. In Lynch v. Donnelly, decided in 1984, a majority ofJustices applied the Lemon test to uphold the public display of a creche
as part of a larger Christmas exhibition. Yet, because of dissatisfaction with the Lemon test, Justice O'Connor wrote a persuasive concurrence that advocated the adoption of an endorsement test, consisting
of two prongs: first, does the state action create excessive governmental entanglement with religion, and second, does the state action
2
amount to governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion.1
Over the next several years, the Court continued to apply the
Lemon test, even as additional Justices expressed support for the endorsement test. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, decided in 1989, the
Court faced constitutional challenges to two different governmental
displays of religious symbols, one including a creche and one including a Chanukah menorah. 17 A majority of Justices could not agree
on any one test or standard for determining the constitutionality of
these displays. The Court's majority opinion articulated both the
Lemon and the endorsement tests, suggesting that the latter refined
the former. 174 Yet, a plurality opinion in the same case fully accepted
the endorsement test and argued further that a majority of Justices
previously had accepted the test, though never in one majority opinion.175 Finally, Justice Anthony Kennedy, concurring in part and dissenting in part, advocated that the Court adopt yet a different approach to Establishment Clause issues. Kennedy's coercion test had
two parts: first, the "government may not coerce anyone to support
or participate in any religion or its exercise,' 76 and second, the government "may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact
'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."",7

171

403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)

17'

492 U.S. 573 (1989)
Id. at 592-94.
The plurality argued that the four dissenters in Lynch actually had accepted the endorse-

(quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) and
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
172 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
'74
175

ment test, as articulated in O'Connor's Lynch concurrence. See id. at 596-97 (plurality opinion).
,76 Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in thejudgment in part
and dissenting in part).
177Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
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In subsequent cases, the Court has occasionally applied Kennedy's
coercion test without rejecting either of the other tests. 7 "
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,7 9 decided in 2002, the Court appeared to consolidate these various Establishment Clause tests with a
conservative twist, thus effectively diminishing First Amendment protections for religious outsiders. The Zelman Court upheld a school
voucher program from Cleveland, Ohio, that allowed parents to use
public money to help pay for private school education, including at
religious or sectarian schools. The majority opinion recited only the
first two prongs of the Lemon test, the purpose and effects prongs.""
Justice Breyer's dissent stressed the third prong, governmental entanglement with religion, by arguing that the voucher program would
generate "religiously based social conflict" or divisiveness.n' The majority, in a footnote, dismissed this concern as irrelevant: "We quite
rightly have rejected the claim that some speculative potential for divisiveness bears on the constitutionality of educational aid programs."8 2 In fact, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Zelman maintained that the Court had previously "folded the entanglement
inquiry into the primary effect inquiry.
Zelman thus seems to shift the judicial focus to a modified Lemon
test, consisting of only two prongs, purpose and effects. Notably, the
two leading proponents of alternative doctrines, Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy, both joined the Zelman majority opinion, which briefly
mentioned endorsement and coercion as if they were mere consid-

178See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (applying Allegheny's
coercion

test to a school district's policy of allowing student-led pre-football game prayers); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (applying Allegheny's coercion test to a policy of allowing nondemoninational prayer at high school graduation ceremonies).
179536 U.S. 639 (2002).
]soId. at 648-49 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997)).
181 Id. at 717, 723-35 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 662 n.7.
183 Id. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
O'Connor was following an interpretation of
Agostini v. Felton, set forth inJustice Thomas's plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000). Thomas wrote:
In Agostini ... we brought some clarity to our case law, by overruling two anomalous
precedents (one in whole, the other in part) and by consolidating some of our previously
disparate considerations under a revised test. Whereas in Lemon we had considered
whether a statute (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an excessive entanglement between government and religion, in Agostini we modified Lemon for purposes of evaluating aid to schools and examined only the first and second factors. We acknowledged that our cases discussing
excessive entanglement had applied many of the same considerations as had our cases
discussing primary effect, and we therefore recast Lemon's entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining a statute's effect. We also acknowledged that
our cases had pared somewhat the factors that could justify a finding of excessive entanglement.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000) (citations omitted).
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erations under the effects prong.8 4 Furthermore, and perhaps even
more important, the Zelman Court disemboweled the Lemon effects
prong. The very point of an effects prong, it would seem, is to inquire into the consequences of governmental action, regardless of
the government's intentions or purposes. In other words, for the effects prong to be meaningful, the Court should ask the following
question: does the governmental action advance or inhibit religion
within the actual social and cultural context of the dispute? Given
this focus, a crucial method for proving that the primary effect of a
governmental action is to benefit religion would be through statistical
evidence. For instance, the complainants in Zelman argued that although the voucher program appeared neutral on its face, ninety-six
percent of the beneficiaries sent their children to religious schools. 8 5
Tellingly, the Zelman Court discounted such statistical evidence as inconsequential. 8 6 "Our focus," the Court wrote, "was on neutrality
and the principle of private choice, not on the number of program
beneficiaries attending religious schools." 87
This transformation of the Establishment Clause doctrine seems
designed to favor the religious mainstream to the detriment of religious outsiders. In future cases, the sole genuine judicial inquiry will
be into governmental purpose; the effects prong has been rendered
nominal. Thus, so long as the government does not appear to purposefully or intentionally favor specific religions or religion in general, the governmental action will be upheld. The fact that the government's action might grossly favor mainstream religions is
immaterial under Zelman. And of course, any supposedly neutral
governmental program that allows benefits to flow to religious institu184

Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655-56. O'Connor herself refers to endorsement as no more than an

alternative phrasing of the effects prong.
The Court's opinion in these cases focuses on a narrow question related to the Lemon
test: how to apply the primary effects prong in indirect aid cases? Specifically, it clarifies
the basic inquiry when trying to determine whether a program that distributes aid to
beneficiaries, rather than directly to service providers, has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or, as I have put it, of "endors[ing] or disapprov[ing] ...religion."
Id. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984)
(O'Connor,J., concurring)) (citation omitted).
185 Id. at 658-59.
186
The Court wrote:
The constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on
whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run
by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious
school.. .. "[S]uch an approach would scarcely provide the certainty that this field
stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled standards by which such statistical evidence might be evaluated."
Id. at 658 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983)). The Zelman Court also disputed
the accuracy of the statistical evidence in that case. Id. at 658-59.
187 Id. at
652.
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tions is likely, in reality, to disproportionately favor mainstream religions since the overwhelming majority of people belong to those religions (which is largely why they are called the mainstream). Meanwhile, any governmental action that appears to disproportionately
favor an outsider religion will immediately be judicially suspect as
8
after all, how else
purposefully benefiting that religion'"-because,
could a legislature funnel benefits to an outsider religion unless it did
so intentionally? Thus, quite rightly, Justice Souter's Zelman dissent
denounced the majority's approach as a "verbal formalism," s9 ajudicial inquiry lacking in any real substance; the Zelman doctrine allows
the religious mainstream to direct benefits to itself under the guise of
governmental neutrality.
In the area of free exercise, the Court in Sherbert v. Verner, '90 a
1963 decision, articulated a strict scrutiny test that would remain, at
least nominally, the presumptive standard in free exercise cases for
over twenty-five years. According to this test, a state could justify a
burden on an individual's free exercise of religion only by showing
that the state action was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. While this judicial standard seemed rigorous and favorable to
free exercise claimants, including religious outsiders, it proved otherwise in application. The Court repeatedly upheld challenged governmental actions by reasoning either that the government had compelling purposes for its conduct or that strict scrutiny was
inappropriate under the specific circumstances.' 91 In fact, from 1973
action contrauntil 1990, the Court concluded that a governmental
192
vened the Free Exercise Clause only three times.
Nonetheless, in Employment Division v. Smith, decided in 1990, the
Court expressly changed the doctrine for evaluating free exercise

188See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (striking down the creation of a school
district that benefited HasidicJews).
189 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 688-89 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
190 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
191 See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (reasoning that strict scrutiny
was inappropriate because of need to defer to prison officials); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503 (1986) (reasoning that strict scrutiny was inappropriate because of the special needs of
the military); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny but concluding
that the Free Exercise Clause did not require the federal government to exempt an Old Order
Amish employer from collecting and paying Social Security taxes).
192 All three cases involved unemployment compensation. Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment
Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a
Christian who refused to work on Sundays but did not belong to established church or sect);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a convert to Seventh-day Adventism); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding unconstitutional
the denial of unemployment benefits to aJehovah's Witness who refused to continue to work in
a munitions factory because of his religious objections to war).
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claims.193 The Court abandoned the strict scrutiny test for free exercise challenges to laws of general applicability, except for cases, like
Sherbert, that involved the denial of unemployment compensation.9
Apart from that narrow situation, the Court suggested that the "political process" should effectively determine the scope of free exercise
rights. '
The Smith Court, in other words, moved from the previous free
exercise doctrine of presumptively applying strict scrutiny-at least
supposedly showing almost no deference to the political process-to
a doctrine without any meaningful judicial scrutiny of challenged
governmental actions-a standard showing remarkable deference to
the legislative process. Thus, as with the Zelman doctrine under the
Establishment Clause, the Smith doctrine under the Free Exercise
Clause appears to blatantly favor the religious mainstream at the expense of outsiders. Because of the nature of our majoritarian legislative processes, laws of general applicability are unlikely to burden
mainstream religions. Legislators are likely either to belong to the
mainstream religions or to be fully aware of their practices and beliefs. Out of ignorance or indifference, though, legislators are likely
sometimes to enact general laws that incidentally or accidentally burden the exercise of outsider religions. Yet, members of such religions
will be unable to get judicial relief under Smith. Instead, they will be
left to beseech legislatures in the hope of procuring statutory exemptions. To be sure, such legislative exemptions will sometimes be
forthcoming, 96 but they will be due to majoritarian tolerance or
whim. From the outsiders' viewpoint, there is a huge difference between tolerance and constitutional right.
B. Recommended DoctrinalChanges
Doctrine can change, as the recent spate of Rehnquist Court innovations in First Amendment jurisprudence illustrates. With the
possibility of further change in mind, this section recommends a

193

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a Christian who refused to work on Sundays but
did not belong to established church or sect).
195 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
at 890.
196 In fact, after the Court decided Smith, Congress attempted to reinstate the strict
scrutiny
test by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), which the Court in
City of Boerne v. Hores promptly struck down as beyond congressional power. Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, Nov. 16, 1993, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)) (reinstating the compelling state interest test for laws of
general applicability infringing free exercise rights); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (striking down RFRA).
194
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number of doctrinal modifications in the establishment and free exercise areas that presumably would benefit religious outsiders.
Under the Establishment Clause, religious minorities would welcome a stronger focus on the effects of governmental actions,
whether under the guise of a reinvigorated Lemon effects prong or
under some other appellation. Legislatures today rarely discriminate
purposefully against religious outsiders, 9 7 yet those same legislatures
might unwittingly enact laws that bestow disproportionate benefits on
mainstream religions. Such disproportionate benefits are not diminished even if such a law is neutral on its face. And of course, some
clever legislators can intentionally design laws that are facially neutral
but that will have disproportionate effects. In theory, these duplicitous laws should be struck down under the still-remaining purpose
prong from Lemon, but in reality, proving discriminatory legislative
purpose or intent is notoriously difficult.'98
Ideally, from the standpoint of religious outsiders, when an Establishment Clause claimant presents statistical evidence showing that a
governmental action confers disproportionate benefits either on
members of one particular religion, mainstream religions as a whole,
or religious believers in general, then the Court should hold the action unconstitutional. Short of this ideal, the Court at a minimum
should create a presumption of unconstitutionality if such evidence is
presented. The government could then overcome this presumption
with a showing of a sufficiently compelling interest. In other words,
the Court could resurrect the Lemon effects prong under the Establishment Clause as a type of strict scrutiny test: a showing of disproportionate effects, possibly through statistical evidence, would shift
the burden to the government to justify its action with a compelling
reason.
Another possible way to bolster Establishment Clause protections
could be developed either through the coercion test or the endorse197

For one example of such purposeful discrimination, albeit from the free exercise context,

see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), which
voided Florida's animal cruelty laws that had been interpreted to punish killings for religious
reasons.
198 See generally Vill.
of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68
(1977) (discussing proof of discriminatory purpose in context of equal protection case). It is
the rare case, indeed, where a legislator openly admits to having discriminatory intent. One
such Establishment Clause case was Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). The Court there
noted:
The sponsor of the bill that became § 16-1-20.1, Senator Donald Holmes, inserted into
the legislative record-apparently without dissent-a statement indicating that the legislation was an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools. Later Senator
Holmes confirmed this purpose before the District Court. In response to the question
whether he had any purpose for the legislation other than returning voluntary prayer to
public schools, he stated: "No, I did not have no [sic] other purpose in mind."
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56-57 (footnotes omitted).

JOURNAL OFCONSTITUTIONAL LA W

(Vol. 6:2

ment test (or a reinvigorated Lemon entanglements prong). Each of
these tests requires the Court to evaluate whether a governmental action produces a certain state of affairs-either coercion or endorsement of (or entanglement with) religion-and thus the application
of these doctrines depends partly on the perspective that the Court
adopts. For instance, the coercion test requires the Court to strike
down any law that coerces anyone to support or participate in any religion, but from whose perspective should the presence or absence of
coercion be judged? Should coercion be judged from the perspective of the reasonable person or observer-a standard that would incorporate the values and interests of the dominant or mainstream religions-or should coercion be judged from the perspective of the
reasonable religious dissenter or outsider? If the Court were to adopt
the view of the reasonable dissenter or outsider, the Court would be
more likely to conclude that coercion was present. After all, as a matter of definition, the reasonable outsider will not share all the interests and values of the mainstream; otherwise, she would be an insider
rather than an outsider (or dissenter).
Although several Justices have expressed a preference for the reasonable observer perspective in the endorsement test context,'19 the
current case law provides at least some support for adopting the reasonable dissenter or outsider perspective. In Lee v. Weisman, decided
in 1992, the Court focused on the issue of coercion: did a public
school practice of having clergy deliver prayers at graduation coerce a
student such as Deborah Weisman, who was Jewish, into participating
in a religious exercise?200 In concluding that coercion was present,
the Court emphasized that the graduates were adolescents who might
be coerced more easily than adults. Thus, contrary to Justice Scalia's
dissent, the Lee majority reasoned that coercion might exist even
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653-56 (2002); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001). In Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,
515 U.S. 753 (1995), Justices O'Connor and Stevens debated the content of a reasonable observer standard. Justice O'Connor's concurrence, joined by justices Souter and Breyer, stated
that "the endorsement test necessarily focuses upon the perception of a reasonable, informed
observer." Id. at 773 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This reasonable observer, O'Connor explained, should be "a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined
by the [collective] social judgment." Id. at 780 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)). Justice Stevens, dissenting, agreed that the
endorsement test was the appropriate standard and that it should be applied from the perspective of a reasonable observer. According to Stevens, though, O'Connor's conception of the reasonable observer resembled an "ideal human [who] comes off as a well-schooled jurist." Id. at
800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The reasonable observer, Stevens argued, should be a person
"who may not share the particular religious belief" symbolized in the disputed public display.
Id. at 799. Thus, Stevens's reasonable observer might be construed to resemble a reasonable
dissenter or outsider.
200 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (holding that the coercive thrust
of a public school's practice of
graduation prayer violated the Establishment Clause).
199
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though the government was not "by force of law and threat of penalty" imposinF a religious orthodoxy or demanding financial support
for religion.20 Coercion could be indirect and could arise from psychological pressure to conform to certain religious practices.
Moreover, in the Court's words, a "reasonable dissenter" in the position of Deborah Weisman would have believed that her attendance at
graduation "signified her own participation or approval of [the
prayers].
Turning to free exercise doctrine, the introduction of a series of
presumptions favoring the claimant would possibly benefit religious
outsiders. These presumptions would be designed to encourage the
Justices (and other judges), who are typically political and religious
insiders, to sympathize more closely with the plight of outsiders. The
need for such presumptions is paramount. As already discussed, legislatures today rarely discriminate purposefully against religious outsiders, yet legislatures might occasionally burden the practices or beliefs of religious outsiders because of ignorance or indifference. If a
legislator is unaware of the practices of a particular minority religion,
she might support the enactment of a general law that could have
disastrous consequences for members of that religion. The fact that
the legislator might have harbored no malice at all toward the religion would be little solace to its practitioners. So, for instance, probably few members of Congress who supported the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program or the Food Stamp program even contemplated how a statutory requirement for recipients to supply Social
Security numbers might affect or burden religious practices and beliefs. 0 4 Yet eventually, a Native American complained that the assignment of a social security number would rob his daughter of spiritual power.205
Three different presumptions could help account for the likelihood that outsiders will occasionally confront generally applicable
laws that burden their religious practices and beliefs. First, any claim
of religious conviction should be presumed to be sincere, genuine,
201

Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).

202 The majority wrote:

The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and control of a high school
graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the invocation
and benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt
compulsion.
Id. at 593; see also id. at 593-94 (discussing peer pressure among adolescents).
203 Id. at 593.
204 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (5) (certifying that states will provide Native Americans with equitable
access to assistance); 7 U.S.C. § 2025(e) (requiring citizens in the food stamps program to furnish a social security number to the state agency as a requirement of participation).
205This was the claim made in a free exercise case. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693
(1986).
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and most important, truly religious in nature. This presumption
would possibly discourage the Court from finding, as it did in Goldman v. Weinberger, the Air Force yarmulke case, that outsider religious
practices are
mere personal preferences rather than sincerely reli2 6
gious

acts.

Second, though closely related to the first presumption, any free
exercise claim based on nonvolitional religious practices should be
presumed to be as important, from a religious standpoint, as a claim
based on individual choice related to faith or belief. The Court, in
the past, has accepted the religious importance of faith- or beliefbased claims (which are central to Christianity, especially Protestantism), but has failed to recognize the significance of religious rituals
or sacred objects or events.2

7

Thus, if implemented, this presump-

tion of religious importance might help the Court recognize the religious significance of claims arising from outsider religions that differ
widely from the mainstream, such as in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, where the Court refused to uphold a free exercise
claim even though the governmental actions, building a road and
permitting timber harvesting, would desecrate sacred Indian burial
grounds.
A third presumption would relate to the weighing of religious interests against governmental interests. A free exercise claimant's religious interests should be presumed to outweigh all countervailing
governmental interests unless the government shows that its interests
are of overriding (or compelling) importance and cannot be satisfied
in any other manner. Quite evidently, this presumption would reinstitute the strict scrutiny or compelling state interest test that the
Court at least claimed to apply for many years in free exercise cases.
The reason for reintroducing this presumption is powerful: the
Court might all too easily permit the sacrifice of outsiders' sincere religious interests for the mere convenience of the government or democratic majorities (the religious mainstream). Certainly, one can
understand Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, the Massachusetts
Sunday closing law case, in this vein: the Court refused to order a
free exercise exemption for the Orthodox Jewish claimants even
though the state had already statutorily granted a seemingly endless

2W

475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986) (suggesting that the wearing of a yarmulke by an Orthodox Jew

was merely for personal preference and identity reasons).
207 See Hamilton, supra note 144, at 713 (arguing that the
Court has protected religious beliefs but not conduct); David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty,
76 CORNELL L. REv. 769, 811-13, 828-34, 846-47 (1991) (emphasizing the Court's protection of
volitionalist religions).
20 485 U.S. 439, 441-42
(1988).
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list of exceptions from its closing law. 9 If the Court were to adopt
this recommended presumption-and truly implement a strict scrutiny test-then the Justices would be doctrinally directed to give outsiders' religious interests their due weight and would be less likely to
hand down decisions like Gallagher.
C. The Likelihood and Significance of DoctrinalChange
Doctrine matters. Religious outsiders, for instance, unquestionably benefited when the Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses to apply against state and local governments in the 1940s.1 ° Before that time, outsiders could not
possibly bring First Amendment challenges, with any hope of success,
against state or local governments, no matter how egregious the governmental action (though outsiders could nonetheless invoke state
Without 212the doctrine
21
constitutional provisions in state court actions).
of incorporation, then, Engel v. Vitale,"1 Lee v. Weisman, and other
cases that extended some degree of protection to outsiders could not
have been decided.
Recognizing the potential for meaningful change, the previous
Section offered recommendations for doctrinal improvements in a
sanguine spirit. Yet, given Parts I and II of this Article, one must ask
the following question: in reality, will these suggestions for doctrinal
changes be likely to help religious outsiders? The discouraging answer: probably not. Two reasons lead to this conclusion. First, the
Court is unlikely to change Religion Clause doctrine in the recommended manner. Second, even if the Court were to do so, the modified doctrine might not significantly alter the outcomes of future Religion Clause cases.
Why is the Court unlikely to change Religion Clause doctrine in
the recommended manner? As a general matter, a yawning abyss
stretches today between the Supreme Court and legal scholars. The
Court shows little interest in legal scholarship and, in fact, has occa-

20 366 U.S. 617, 627 (1961)
(upholding Massachusetts's Sunday closing laws). The Smith
case can be understood similarly. That is, as the Smith dissenters argued, the state's interest in
prohibiting the religious use of peyote as part of its war against drugs did not outweigh the free
exercise claimant's interest in using peyote as part of the religious rituals of the Native American Church. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 911 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Put in different words, the state did not have a compelling enough interest tojustify its interference with the claimant's free exercise of religion. Id. at 907.
210 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment Clause);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause).
21 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

12 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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sionally expressed disdain for legal academics. 213 More specific to Religion Clause jurisprudence, though, the historical discussions in
Parts I and II of this Article illustrate, if nothing else, that the Justices'
religious orientations influence their decisions in First Amendment
cases. The successes and failures of American Jews who litigated before the Court starkly illustrate the impact that religion has on First
Amendment cases. So long as the Court remains predominantly
Christian, its decisions and doctrines are likely to favor Christian (if
not Protestant) interests and values. In short, the Rehnquist Court,
as constituted, is unlikely to reverse itself in order to structure Religion Clause doctrine to be more favorable to religious outsiders.
To be sure, the Court is more religiously diverse now than it has
ever been before. That diversity might, in theory, prompt the Court
to be more receptive to the claims of religious outsiders. But still,
such a liberal turn seems improbable given that seven of the Justices'
backgrounds are from mainstream Christian religions, while only two
of the Justices, Breyer and Ginsberg, are non-Christian.2 14 Moreover,
to some extent, the religious divisions between Protestant and Catholic Justices, like Rehnquist and Scalia, seem to pale in the glow of
their conservative political bonds. It is commonplace now to acknowledge that conservative Catholics and fundamentalist Protestants
share more in common on certain political and moral issues than do
liberal and conservative Protestants.1 5 Thus, the majority-block of politically conservative Justices will likely repress any religiously induced

213

See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning

the validity of the Association of American Law Schools' "view of what prejudices must be
stamped out"); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
majority opinion) (criticizing the dissent's disregard of prior case law "in favor of a theory cobbled together from law review articles" and its "undocumented and highly speculative extralegal
explanation"); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995) (Scalia, J., majority
opinion) (showing disdain for doctrine even where it is supported by "all the law professors in
the land"). Judge Harry T. Edwards wrote "that judges, administrators, legislators, and practitioners have little use for much of the scholarship that is now produced by members of the
academy." Harry T. Edwards, The GrowingDisjunctionBetween Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34,35 (1992).
214 If Clarence Thomas-who was

born a Baptist, raised a Catholic, began attending an Episcopal Church, and then returned to Catholicism-is categorized as Catholic, then 1996 marked
the first time that a majority of the Justices were not Protestant. MAZUR, supra note 18, at 12,
179 n.3; see THE SUPREME COURTJUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993, at 530 (Clare
Cushman ed., 1993) (detailing Thomas's religious background).
215 See, e.g., Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 358-60 (discussing shifting alliances on church
and state issues and the shared concerns of conservative Protestants and Catholics); Suzanna
Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L.
REv. 499, 516-17 (1998) (discussing a conservative Catholic and evangelical Protestant "alliance"); John Quist, Book Review, 20 L. & HIST. REV. 431, 433 (2002) (noting "the common

moral ground between contemporary conservative Catholics and Protestants").
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inclinations toward the protection of individual rights, whether under
the First Amendment or otherwise.1 "

Indeed, the Court's recent Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause landmarks suggest the strength of these political forces working in conjunction with the Justices' mainstream religious orientations. If anything, the Court currently leans strongly toward favoring
the mainstream to the detriment of religious outsiders. Thus, in Zelman, the Court wrote: "The constitutionality of a neutral educational
aid program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a particular
area, at a particular time, most private schools are run by religious
organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious
school. 2 1' The Court, in other words, is not troubled if a facially neutral law effectively funnels public money to schools owned and operated by mainstream religions. Even more starkly, the Smith Court reasoned that the religious diversity of the American people actually
threatened potential "anarchy. 2 1 As such, according to the Court,
American diversity not only justified but even necessitated the transition from a strict scrutiny to a deferential test under free exercise:
[I]f "compelling interest" really means what it says (and watering it down
here would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many
laws will not meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be
courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the
society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or
suppress none of them. Precisely because "we are a cosmopolitan nation
made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference," and
precisely because we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the
religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an
interest of the highest order219

In sum, then, the Court is unlikely to alter Religion Clause doctrine in the recommended ways. Moreover, even if the Court surprisingly were to follow the recommended changes, the modified establishment and free exercise doctrines might not substantially alter the
outcomes of future Religion Clause cases. Doctrine matters, but in a
sense that is less than most lawyers, judges, and law professors care to
admit. To be precise, doctrine matters, but doctrine must always be
interpreted. Significantly, then, one's political, cultural (religious),
and social perspectives necessarily orient the interpretive process.
26 My list of political conservatives on the Court is not quirky
at all. I would include
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas as die-hard political conservatives, with O'Connor and Kennedy
close behind.
217Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 658 (2002).
218 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 888 (1990).

Id. (citations omitted).
220See Stephen M. Feldman, An Arrow to the Heart: The Love and Death of
Postmodern Legal
29

Scholarship, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2361 (2001) ("We are always already situated in some cultural
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No more so than any other interpreter, a Supreme CourtJustice cannot read First Amendment doctrine without being situated in a particular political, cultural (religious), and social context that affects his
or her interpretive conclusions. This interpretive necessity is, once
again, one of the lessons from the history laid out in Parts I and II.
The Court's doctrinal statements in Religion Clause cases often do
not reflect the reality of the decisions. Thus, as Parts I and II demonstrate, the Warren and Burger Courts were not as liberal in establishment and free exercise areas as is commonly believed-and as is
suggested by those Courts' doctrinal statements. The strict scrutiny
test that was theoretically propitious for religious minorities and that
the Warren and Burger Courts supposedly applied in free exercise
exemption cases for more than twenty-five years did little to help nonChristian outsiders-after all, as discussed, they lost every case at the
Supreme Court level. Meanwhile, in Establishment Clause cases, the
outcomes turned less on the doctrine that supposedly was being applied than on the ability of the religious outsiders to articulate their
positions as consistent with the religious mainstream.
Hence, even if the Rehnquist Court were to adopt my recommended doctrines for establishment and free exercise casesdoctrinal approaches that appear favorable to religious outsidersthe Court's decisions still would be strongly influenced by the religious (as well as political) orientations of the Justices and by the religious slant of the claimants' arguments. In short, when the claimants
present their arguments so that their religious beliefs and practices
appear largely consistent with the American mainstream, they have
some reasonable chance of success. If they instead argue so that their
religious beliefs and practices appear exceptional or contrary to the
mainstream, then the probability of success diminishes, practically to
nil.
This section of the Article, so far, has argued as follows: first, the
Rehnquist Court is unlikely to adopt my recommended doctrines under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, despite the merits
of the recommendations; and second, even if the Court were to accept these innovations, the results in subsequent cases would change
little. One final and important point must be added, though.

context, and that context is therefore necessarily the starting point for all communication.. . ."); Stephen M. Feldman, Made For Each Other: The Interdependence of Deconstruction and
PhilosophicalHermeneutics, 26 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 51, 54-57 (2000) (discussing Hans-Georg
Gadamer's assertion that "an interpreter is always situated in a communal 'tradition' that inculcates the individual with prejudices and interests, which then constrain and direct the understanding of any text. .. ."); Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95
MICH. L. REv. 166, 173-84 (1996) (discussing Gadamer's view that "communal tradition and
individual prejudices and interests constrain what one can possibly understand or see in a
text.").
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Namely, the Rehnquist Court, despite its purported conservative doctrinal changes in Religion Clause cases, is unlikely to be as conservative-as hostile to Religion Clause claimants-as many progressive
scholars and commentators fear.
In fact, the Rehnquist Court's establishment and free exercise decisions are likely, in the end, to closely resemble those of its predecessor Courts. Without doubt, non-Christian outsiders cannot fare any
worse before the Supreme Court under the Smith free exercise doctrine than they did under the strict scrutiny test. In addition, under
the Establishment Clause, the Zelman doctrine is unlikely to produce
outcomes far different from those that would otherwise be reached
by the same set ofJustices if they were instead applying the traditional
Lemon test, the endorsement test, or the coercion test. The Zelman
approach obviously shares much in common with Lemon, since Zelman, at least nominally, reiterates the first two Lemon prongs. More
importantly, the differences among the various Establishment Clause
doctrines are neither momentous nor forceful enough to consistently
overcome the Justices' religious and political orientations. In short,
the doctrinal modifications are unlikely to produce different case
outcomes.
To illustrate the point, some constitutional scholars have celebrated O'Connor's endorsement test in comparison to the Lemon test,
suggesting that the endorsement test could transform Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.2"2' Yet, O'Connor herself has interpreted the
endorsement test to echo Lemon. 2
More significantly, when
O'Connor has applied the endorsement test in specific cases, she has
typically agreed with the conclusions of her colleagues who had applied the traditional Lemon prongs.2
221

'3

Thus, regardless of the rhetori-

Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Estab-

lishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049
(1986) (analyzing past and potential Establishment Clause cases in light of Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test); see also Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543, 593-95, 613-16 (1986) (describing Justice O'Connor's
feminist perspective in Establishment Clause cases and recognizing the "potential for development of a feminist jurisprudence").
222 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 668-70 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Nor does today's decision signal a major departure from this Court's prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence.");
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (discussing the Lemon
test as it bears on endorsement).
223For instance, in Lynch, the majority applied the Lemon test, while Justice O'Connor articulated and applied the endorsement test in a concurrence. O'Connor, though, reached the
same conclusion as the majority: constitutionally approving the public display of a creche as
part of a larger Christmas exhibition. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor, J, concurring). In
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995), the Court held that a
private actor, the Ku Klux Klan, could constitutionally display a large Latin (Christian) cross on
public property. A four-Justice plurality, with an opinion written by Justice Scalia, outright rejected the endorsement test. Id. at 763-67. Yet O'Connor, writing for Justices Souter and
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cal distinctions between the endorsement test and the traditional
Lemon test, the doctrinal differences were insufficient to compel the
Justices to divergent outcomes. The same will be true under Zelman.
CONCLUSION

Partly because of enhanced Catholic political power, as explained
in Parts I and II of this Article, the postwar Protestant-dominated Supreme Court articulated First Amendment principles that could be
used as a bulwark against perceived Catholic overreaching. Jews and
other non-Christian outsiders became the incidental beneficiaries of
these judicial pronouncements. By invoking these supposedly broad
principles rather than idiosyncratic Jewish interests and values-as
well as by emphasizing the importance of the strict separation of
church and state for promoting religiosity-Jewish organizations
sometimes successfully urged the Court to stretch the protections of
the Establishment Clause. 24 The Jewish organizations, in other
words, found they needed to present Establishment Clause arguments that largely corresponded with the already-in-place mainstream
understandings of religion and religious freedom. Unsurprisingly,
then, Jews and other religious outsiders consistently lost before the
Supreme Court when, under the Free Exercise Clause, they sought
exceptions to this same mainstream understanding, as manifested in
generally applicable laws and in prior Court decisions.
When the postwar cases are examined from a political, cultural,
and social perspective rather than from a doctrinal one, they reveal a
significant judicial succor for the religious mainstream and a
concomitant aversion toward non-Christian outsiders. The Rehnquist
Court, to a great extent, has maintained these sentiments, and in all
likelihood, this Supreme Court pattern will continue in the future.
To be sure, the Rehnquist Court has turned First Amendment doctrine in a seemingly conservative direction, but these changes are
unlikely to produce results substantially different from prior decisions, at least at the level of the Supreme Court.
Ultimately, the Court will continue to vindicate the occasional
First Amendment claim that remains consistent with mainstream religious, cultural, and political outlooks. The Court, likewise, will continue to repudiate the more radical claims that would require a judicial departure from mainstream understandings of religion and

Breyer, applied the endorsement test and reached the same result as the Scalia plurality, upholding the display of the cross. Id. at 776-78 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
24 This conclusion is consistent with Dahl's observation that "[iut
follows that within the
somewhat narrow limits set by the basic policy goals of the dominant alliance, the Court can
make national policy." Dahl, supra note 32, at 293-94.
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religious freedom. These are the lessons from history, and the
Court's tinkerings with the establishment and free exercise doctrines
are unlikely to change that reality.

